The Origins, Driving Forces, and Networks of Non-State Groups' Actions in Southeast Asia: Notes on Human Security Threats[*]

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Abstract

This paper discusses non-state groups' actions related to terrorism or terror attacks in Southeast Asia with the study cases of Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand. They are highlighted from the perspectives of their origins, driving forces, and groups' networks, and understood as a contemporary threat to human security in the region. Concerning their origins, while in the Philippine and Thai cases such actions are traceable to the disputed territorial claims and have a strong link with insurgency, in the Indonesian case, such actions are originated from a strong passion to establish a perceived ideal state and are inspired by the goal and struggle of the insurgent group in the past. Second, greed and grievance approached used to understand such non-state groups' actions are not sufficient to explain the current phenomenon. The findings reveal that the ideology of violence considerably contributes to such actions in the researched countries. Third, the groups built their networks in sustaining their movement and furthering their goals. A stronger link is found between the groups in Indonesia and the Philippines, while in the Thai case the group is seemingly still in its "formative years" in establishing link with that of, particularly, Indonesia. The evidence also shows, besides utilising actual network, the Indonesian group in particular utilises virtual network in sustaining their movement. The virtual network is more resilient than the actual one, and therefore, the threats of terror attacks are still imminent. Such non-state groups' actions have serious impacts on the very basic human security in the region. In dealing with the current problems and future threats on the human security, multi-dimensional efforts are required with emphasis on non-conventional approach (non-military approach), particularly through investment in education, economic empowerment, and the promotion of religious tolerance.

Introduction

The 9/11 attack (2001) and other terror attacks like Bali bombings (2003, 2005), Superferry attack in the Philippines (2005), and terror attacks against civilians in Thailand (2004-2007), can be categorised as non-state groups' actions against the states as well as societies. In the discourse of terrorism, there is also terror acts carried out by state actor known as state terrorism. This research focuses on non-state groups' actions related to terrorism and insurgency utilising terror tactics.

Terrorism or terror attack is not a new phenomenon. In fact, it has existed since at least the first century, when an extreme Jewish faction, *sicarii* (dagger men) stage terror attacks against Roman rulers of Judea and their collaborators in the ancient Palestine during AD 66-73. Records also noted this kind of attack in other areas of the Middle East, where a minority sect of the Shi'ites known as *hashassins* (*assasins*) attacked prominent Sunni leaders during the 11th-13th centuries. Similar phenomenon was also found in Europe (generations of "witches" vs. "witches" hunters during the 12th-18th centuries, particularly during the "witches delusion" in 1450-1750), India (the *Thuggee*, 12th-19th century), France during the French

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revolution (revolutionary groups vs. Jacobins' army), Russia (Narodnaya Volya, 1878-1881), America (Ku Klux Klan, ca.1915-1944), Germany (Baader-Meinhof, 1960s-1980s), etc. (Laqueur 1987, 1999, 2002; Stern 2003; Kronenwetter 2004). Efforts to collect data systematically on (international) terror attacks, however, have only been carried out since 1982. Based on statistical records, international terror attacks are quite high and threatening the world order (U.S. Department of State 2004).

While a transformative Asia is promisingly moving forward into its political maturity and socio-economic advancement, this region (particularly Southeast Asia) at the same time faces imminent threats that could undermine the current and future achievements, particularly its political and economic stabilities. One of the threats is terrorism or terror attacks. In fact, terror attacks in this region had been increasing during 1998-2003 (U.S. Department of State 2004) and more lethal during 2000-2007. Currently, the threats of terror attacks in this region are still significant. This means the very basic human security in this region was seriously attacked and would continue to be implicated and threatened.

To deal with such threats or problems, one should better understand the nature of such non-state groups' actions. To obtain their vivid pictures in this region, this research sheds light such actions in three religiously distinct countries, namely Indonesia (predominantly Muslims), the Philippines (predominantly Catholics), and Thailand (predominantly Buddhists). The main objectives of this work are, first, to better understand the origins and driving forces of such actions and the networks built by the perpetrators, and second, to identify historical, structural, and ideological roots of the problems. The significances of this work are, first, it can be used as entry points to deal with the issues highlighted. Second, to promote the increased use of non-conventional approach (non-military approach) in solving the problems. Third, to promote religious tolerance in building a more peaceful society.

This research applies qualitative analysis of the collected data. The collected data are primary and secondary data obtained through in-depth interviews, personal communications, focus group discussions, and library research. While the analysis of the Philippine and Thai cases is mainly based on the data collected during the fieldworks, the analysis of the Indonesian case is based on my academic observation of the case and library research. The findings are presented in a comparative (political) study.

The following parts are divided into four main sections. The first section discusses conceptual framework aiming at providing foundation for the discussion throughout this work. The second one discusses non-state groups' actions in the form of terror attacks and their origins in the researched countries. The third and last sections highlight the driving forces of such actions and the groups' networks respectively.

Conceptual Framework

Categories of non-state groups' actions vary widely, from peaceful demonstration and street confrontation against security apparatus to insurgencies and terrorism. This work centers on terrorism and insurgency utilising terror tactics. While insurgency can be easily understood as a non-state group's action, terrorism in fact can be grouped into two main categories, namely state terrorism and non-state terrorism. Here, state terrorism is beyond the discussion of this study.

There are over one hundred definitions of terrorism proposed by experts and governments (Schmidt and Jongman, in Malik 2002). An expert, H.H.A. Cooper, for

instance, defines that "terrorism is the intentional generation of massive fear by human beings for the purpose of securing or maintaining control over other human beings" (Cooper 2004:56). Another expert, Reid, defines terrorism as "a pattern of sudden violent or fear-inducing action against civilians, not part of a national military action in a declared war between nations" (Reid 2002:2). Sharif Abdullah defines terrorism as an action aiming at: "[a] Intentionally inflicting pain, suffering, and death on civilians and/or other non-combatants, for the purpose of achieving an aim; [b] Inflicting pain, suffering, and death on civilians and/or other non-combatants, in callous disregard of their human and civil rights; [c] Creating an atmosphere of fear and horror, through the use and/or threat of violence" (Abdullah 2002:131). Moreover, Adam L. Silverman argued that "terrorism is the systematic use of violence by actors who have a subcultural identity attachment—either subjective or objective [—attempting] to bring about social and political change through fear and intimidation" (Silverman 2004:155).

Many more definitions can be incurred, but one will find the same problem: differing opinions on terrorism. In fact, attempts to find a single universal definition have "been long and painful and is now living a separate life of its own." They have come "to resemble the quest for the Holy Grail" (Malik 2000:vii). This particularly becomes problematic when it is related to independence struggle, guerilla movement, or insurgency, as described in a conundrum "one state's 'terrorist' is another state's 'freedom fighter,'"[1] "one person's terrorist is another person's freedom fighter" (Primoratz 2004:xi), or "what one's enemies do is terrorism, what one does oneself is not" (Kronenwetter 2004:14).

One important clue to define terrorism, as Primoratz suggested, is that one should "seek a definition that does not define terrorism in terms of the agent, nor in terms of the agent's ultimate goal" but "should focus on what is done and what the immediate point of doing it is, and put to one side the identity of the agent and their ultimate and allegedly justifying aim" (Primoratz 2004:xii). In distinguishing it with insurgency or guerrilla warfare, John A. Sterling maintained that in the insurgency or guerrilla warfare the fighters would avoid "the random, indiscriminate, acts of violence which are the hallmark of terrorism." He explained "guerrillas, unlike terrorists, will often acknowledge the rules and conventions of war and, also unlike terrorists refuse to engage in acts of violence that arbitrarily kill non-combatants." This is because, "to do so would destroy the base of community support that is vital to the credibility of the guerrilla movement. Terrorism, on the other hand, deliberately intends to create such an intense degree of fear and panic that it will rip apart the social fabric and destroy any vestige of legal authority."[2] Lica Ricolfi also attempts to make a clear distinction by defining that terror attacks are attacks "which have civilian targets" and guerrilla attacks are attacks "which have military targets" (Ricolfi 2005:80).[3] Based on these, it is wrong to say that all insurgents' violent acts regardless of the type of the violence are not terror attacks (e.g. terrorising innocent civilians by insurgents). In the same line, not all violent acts carried out by a terrorist organisation can be categorised as terrorism (e.g. certain violent robbery committed by certain terrorist organisation).

In the acts of terrorism and insurgency utilising terror tactics, there exists a conflict situation as one party uses force or violence against the rival party, the perceived enemy, or the symbolic target/enemy. Therefore, conflict theories are worthwhile to be used as a foundation in analysing it.

The discourse on violent conflicts had been dominated by grievance theories until the late 1990s. This is because grievance "is not only much more functional

externally, it is also more satisfying personally" (Collier 2000:92). As has been widely recognised, the success of certain movements (collective actions, rebellions, etc) relies heavily on the support of individuals as well as the communities. And by "disseminating" grievances, the movement can recruit supporters cheaper. Hence, "even where the rationale at the top of the organization is essentially greed, the actual discourse may be entirely dominated by grievance" (Collier 2000:92).

Gurr provided a comprehensive analysis on how the grievance factor affects violent conflicts. In his view, grievance is the impetus of collective violence (Gurr 1970, 1993). This approach is widely applied in political science to examine political violence, and it is argued that political violence occurs "when grievances are sufficiently acute that people want to engage in violent protest" (Collier 2001).

In relation to terrorism and insurgency utilising terror tactics, Stern observed some types of exposed grievances such as alienation, humiliation, demographic shift, historical wrongs, and claims over territory (Stern 2003). Sharif Abdullah who used to live in the "terrorist environment" asserted that "the terrorists feel: [a] Very angry—an anger based on hurt, pain, and suffering; [b] Unheard—they feel that their beliefs, perspectives, or reality have not been considered or respected; [c] Powerless without resorting to violence; [d] Under attack and forced to fight back—terrorists generally see themselves as victims; [e] Defeated—that they have already lost, have nothing left to lose, and are therefore committed to a 'lose-lose' scenario" (Abdullah 2002:133).[4]

However, grievance theory collides with Olson's theory on the phenomenon of free-riders in a situation of collective action. Since justice is a public good (Collier 2000) the movement will face the problem of free-riding. Collier is evocative of the fact that "even though everyone is agreed that rebellion is desirable, it is even more attractive if the costs are borne only by others and the success of rebellion will not be dependent upon the participation of any one individual" (Collier 1999). Thus, grievance-based factors are insufficient to drive rebellions in many cases. According to Collier, this is the case due to "the non-excludability of the consumption of justice" (Collier 1999).

In view of these problems, Collier looked at the important role of economic motives. In order to underline the contrast to the grievance theory, he called this theory "greed theory." Collier suggested that it is the greed or the economic motive of certain parties that drives a conflict. The greed theory is also regarded as capable of embracing the above problems. As Collier found by the means of the empirical cases, the true cause of violent conflicts is "not the loud discourse of grievance, but the silent force of greed" (in de Soysa 2000). In his study of worldwide rebellion cases, he found that "greed considerably outperforms grievance" (Collier and Hoeffler 2001).

In summarizing her study cases of terrorism and insurgency using terror tactics, Stern maintained that what surprised her most in her research was the "discovery that the slogans sometimes mask not only fear and humiliation, but also greed—greed for political power, land, or money" (Stern 2003:xix). Stern argued that "terrorist group also vary in terms of the extent to which ideology matters. Some terrorist organizations transform themselves, over time, into profit-driven organization for which crime is an end rather than a means. These groups switch from grievance to greed" (Stern 2003:7).

Such approaches are useful to be used in analysing terrorism and insurgency using terror tactics. However, there are some curiosities left concerning the use of such approaches in explaining such terror attacks as suicide bombings in Indonesia. Hence, this research also attempts to go beyond such two contending perspectives.

Terror Attacks and Their Origins in the Researched Countries

      Indonesia with its total population of 208.8 million in 2005 is a Muslim-majority country where Muslims make up 87.20% of the total population, Christians 6.21%, Catholics 3.32%, Hindus 2.20%, and Buddhists 1.07% (BPS 2005).[5] The Philippines is a Catholic majority country with its total population of 76.5 million in 2000, where 84.2% of its people are affiliated with Roman Catholics, 5.4% Protestant denominations, 4.6% Islam, 2.6% Philippine Independence Church, 2.3% Iglesia ni Kristo, and 2.2% others (including animist) (Abinales and Amoroso 2005). In Thailand on the other hand, its population is predominantly Buddhists, amounting 95% of the total population of 60.9 million in 2000. Muslims make up 4.5% of the total population and the rest are Christians, Hindus, and Sikhs (Abuza 2003). In the trouble provinces of Pattani, Yala, and Naratiwat, however, these areas are predominantly Muslims with a proportion of about 77% of the total population.[6] These three countries experienced numerous terror attacks or terror related actions, and some of them are as follows.

Table 1. Main Terror Related Actions in Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand

Indonesia[7]	The Philippines[8]	Thailand[9]
2000. Bombs exploded at a Protestant church (May 28) and a Catholic Church (May 29) in Medan, North Sumatra.	1991. Grenade attack in Zamboanga city, killing two female American missionaries.	2004. A 64-year old monk was killed by slitting his throat (Jan 22); 3 monks & novices were attacked; two died (Jan 24).
2000. 16 of 31 bombs planted in churches across Indonesia exploded in the Christmas Eve; 18 dead, more than 100 injured.	1992. Bomb attacks at a missionary ship of MV Doules in Zamboanga, Zamboanga airport, and Catholic churches, wounding several people.	22 August, 2004. Three bombs exploded in Yala, injuring 13 people and damaging more than 30 vehicles.
2001. Bombs exploded twice at Plaza Atrium, Jakarta (1 August and 23 September), injuring six people in the second blast.	1993. Bomb attack at a cathedral in Davao city, killing seven people. Later, an American, Charles Walton, was kidnapped for 23 days.	Jan-June 2005. 95 village headmen and assistant headmen (Buddhists & Muslims) were assassinated by militants.
2002. Bomb attack in the residence of the Philippine Ambassador, Jakarta, killing two people and injuring several others.	1994-1998. The kidnapping of three Spanish nuns and a Spanish priest (1994); and the kidnapping of two Hongkong men, a Malaysian, and a Taiwanese grandmother (1998).	14 July 2005. Five bombs exploded at a hotel, a restau-rant, and convenience stores (shops were burned), injuring 17 Buddhists and Muslims.
12 October 2002. Powerful bombs exploded in two night clubs (Sari Club & Paddy's Club), Bali; 202 people dead, 317 injured.	2000 (March). The kidnapping of 52 teachers & students in Tumahubong, Basilan. Two teachers were beheaded.	2004-2007. 71 school teachers (including Muslims) were killed, more than 100 teachers were injured in the attacks, 170 schools were burned down.
5 December 2002. Mc Donald bombing at Mall Ratu Indah Plaza (MaRi), Makassar, South Sulawesi; 3 people dead, several people injured.	2000. The Sipadan kidnapping of 19 foreigners & two Filipino (April); Ten Western journalists were kidnapped (June); Three French journalists were kidnapped (July)	14 Mar 2007. A commuter van with nine Buddhists passengers was ambushed. They were shot at a close range in an execution-style; eight dead, one injured.
5 August 2003. Car bomb attack at J.W. Marriott Hotel, Jakarta; 14 people dead, 132 injured, 22 cars damaged.	2001: The kidnapping of 20 people consisting of three Americans and 17 Filipino at Dos Palmas resort, Palawan (May 27).	14 April 2007. Two Muslim men, aged 26 and 29, were gunned down by militants in a drive-by shooting.
9 September 2004. Car bomb attack at Australian Embassy, Jakarta; 11 people dead, tens of people injured.	2004. SuperFerry 14 bombing, killing 118 people, wounding hundreds of people.	22 June 2007. Militants in Naratiwat shot a 29-year old Muslim (local govt official), and partially severed his head.
1 October 2005. Bomb attacks at Café Benega, Café Nyoman,	2005 (Feb). Makati, Davao, General Santos bombings, killing 13 people,	13 August 2007. A Muslim vendor was shot dead in his

and R'Ajas Cafe, Bali; 23 people dead, 148 people injured	injuring 140 people.	pick-up truck by militants from another pick-up truck.

It is undoubtedly that such non-state groups' actions were terrorism, terror attacks, or terror related actions as they systematically or repeatedly killed or intimidated civilians and spread fear among the communities. Such attacks are the attacks on human security in the region, and even the most basic human security that should be exercised by human beings: their safety. As the attacks generated fear to a broader population and the future attacks are still highly possible, they continue to threaten human security in the region. Any persons regardless of their ethnicities, religions, occupations, and socio-economic status, could become victims if, unfortunately, they are in a wrong place in a wrong time. The bombs are blind.

Human beings—by nature—would protect their personal safety, love their lives, and prefer to live in peace. But why did the perpetrators of such actions intentionally "take" other people's lives? Why did they sacrifice their lives to kill other people? Why do they continue to harm and threaten the lives of their fellow human beings? Prior to answering these questions, it is worthwhile to trace the origins of such actions aiming at understanding the development of such actions, their evolution, or historical significance. By doing so, one will understand its historical roots that could inspire the perpetrators to further their goals or be used to justify their actions.

The origins of such non-state groups' actions in Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand have some similarities and differences. Table 2 summarises them as follows.

Table 2. The Origins of Terror Related Actions in Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand

Indonesia[10]	The Philippines[11]	Thailand[12]
Historical Origins		
A strong passion to establish an Indonesian Islamic state but it has been rejected in the political mainstreams: - 1936: Kartosuwiryo first promoted the idea of the establishment of Indonesian Islamic state. - 1945. Indonesia's independence. The Jakarta Charter promoting Islamic rules for its believers was dropped in the 1945 Constitution. - 1947: Kartosuwiryo established Darul Islam (DI) in West Java. - 1948: Kartosuwirtyo established Indonesian Islamic Army (TII). - 1949: Kartosuwiryo proclaimed the establishment of Indonesian Islamic state (NII). - 1950s: DI/TII rebellions spread to Central Java, South Sulawesi, South Kalimantan, and Aceh. - 1962: Kartosuwiryo was captured and executed. His struggle was continued by his successors and followers.	Forced integration of Bangsamoro homeland into the Republic of the Philippines. - 1450: A sovereign Islamic Sultanate of Sulu was established. - 1511: A sovereign Sultanate of Maguindanao was established. Later, the sultanates of Buayan and Ranao were founded. - 1521-1898. The Spaniards arrived in 1521, and the Moro wars occurred in 1665-1898. - 1898-1946. American arrival and occupation. - 1933-1946. In the preparation for independence, several petitions were sent by Moro leaders to American government insisting that if an independent Moroland was not granted, they preferred Moroland remain under American rule rather than to be part of the new republic. But in 1946, Moroland was incorporated into the	Forced integration of Pattani Kingdom into the Thai state. - 1457: A sovereign Islamic Kingdom/Sultanate of Pattani was established. - 1786. The kingdom of Pattani was under Thai control. The kingdom was later subjected to send Flowers of Gold to Bangkok as a tribute and a sign of loyalty. - 1789, 1791, 1808. A series of rebellions against the Thai rule but defeated. - 1898. The incorporation of Pattani into the Kingdom of Thailand. The formal incorporation was in 1902. - 1903. The last Sultan, Abdul Kadir Qomarrudin, revolted against the Thai Kingdom but defeated. - 1909. Anglo-Siamese Treaty delineated the borders of British colonies in Malay and current Thai

	Philippine state.	territories.
Organisational Origins		
Organisation movement is inspired by the goal of the rebel group. - 1962-present: DI/NII's underground movement. - 1985-1995. DI/NII sent their members to Pakistan and Afghanistan (later [with JI], to Mindanao, the Philippines). - 1992: The rift between Abdullah Sungkar and Ajengan Masduki of DI/NII, where the latter was accused of using Shia and Sufi tendencies (soft approaches). - 1993. Abdullah Sungkar established Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) .	Organisation movement is originated from insurgent groups. - 1968-1976. Insurgencies were led by Nur Misuari's MNLF. The 1976 Tripoli Agreement created rifts, and a splinter group, New MNLF, was founded by Hashim Salamat. - 1984. New MNLF was renamed MILF. - 1989. Former MNLF member, Abdurajak Janjalani, after his return from Libya, established *al-Harakatul al-Islamiyyah* (Islamic Movement), later known as the Abu Sayyap.	Organisation movement is originated from insurgent groups. - 1960-1980s. Insurgencies were organised by many groups (GAMPAR,BNPP, PULO, GMIP, BRN, etc). - 2004. The rise of a new generation of insurgents. Learned from the past, they established a faceless and cell-based movement. Later, they are identified as RKK and *"pejuangs"* (associated with BRN-Coordinate [BRN-C]).

Based on that table, the group's actions in Indonesia stemmed from the passions of its members to establish an Islamic state of Indonesia. The recent attacks were contributed by the rise of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) that vowed to establish such a perceived ideal state. In its development it had a shared ideology with al Qaeda and turned its target to American interests. In the Philippine case, it was rooted in the historical disputes concerning the forced incorporation of Moro Sultanates into the Philippine state. The rise of the Abu Sayyap Group (ASG) highly contributed to such attacks, and in its development, the ASG had a shared ideology with Al Qaeda and became notorious with its kidnapping-for-ransom activities, particularly against Westerners. As for the Thai case, the issue is similar to that of the Philippines, namely the forced incorporation of the former Sultanate of Pattani into the Thai state. In the recent terror attacks, the central figure is BRN-C, particularly its mobile combat unit known as *Runda Kumpulan Kecil* (RKK, or small patrol unit). BRN-C has a loose cell-based network with a broader new generation of village-based separatist militants who called themselves *Pejuang Kemerdekaan Patani* (Pattani Freedom Fighters), where local people called them with a generic term "*pejuangs"* (fighters). While RKK also belong to the *pejuangs*, not all *pejuangs* are the members of BRN-C. It is also important to note that not all *pejuangs* attacked civilians.[13]

In short, the Philippine and Thai cases have a shared historical origin centering on the issue of regaining the "occupied" land. This is totally different with that of Indonesia, which is originated from a strong passion to establish a perceived ideal state, the Islamic state of Indonesia.

The Driving Forces
a. The Grievance Issue

Concerning the question on why they carried out terror attacks or actions, this work firstly traced grievance issues. It is undoubtedly that that the terror attacks in Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand were driven by grievances. Table 3 compares main grievances that drive terrorism, terror attacks, or terror related actions in such three countries.

Table 3. Rough Ranking of Main Grievances in the Researched Countries

Indonesia[14]	The Philippines[15]	Thailand[16]
US invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq, where many Muslims have been killed.	Grievance on the surge of Bangsamoro identity (transmigration program, Filipinization, etc.).[17]	Grievance on the surge of ethnic Malay identity (language/education policies, Thainization, etc.).
Israel's occupation of Palestine, where many Muslims have been killed and living in misery.	State-treatment to Muslims (e.g. Jabidah) and injustice.	Injustice and state-treatment to Muslims (e.g. Krue Ze, Tak Bai).
Grievance on secular state of Indonesia.	Grievance on secular state of the Philippines, particularly that applied in Mindanao.	Grievance on secular state of Thailand particularly that applied in Pattani, Yala, and Naratiwat.
Perceived suppression of Islamic movements to establish an Islamic state and/or sharia law.	Natural resource exploitation in Mindanao (ancestral domains).	Natural resource exploitation in the southernmost provinces.
Grievances on perceived Christianization and on Christians in the communal-religious conflicts (Maluku islands, Ambon, Poso).	Perceived discrimination and marginalization in economic development.	Perceived discrimination and marginalization in economic development.

The grievances listed above and the attacks as noted have a religious dimension in all countries. Although in the Indonesian case the current top grievance is anti-American sentiment, it still has a strong religious dimension. Such grievances along with the origins of the problems (historical origin, see Table 2) become the root causes of terrorism and/or terror attacks, consisting of historical roots and structural roots. The existence of these root causes implies the existence of gaps between the state and the community and between two different communities.

It seems that the fulfilment of some of such grievances is beyond the authorities or capabilities of the respective governments (e.g. the issues of US and Israel's policies and actions in the Indonesian case). Some of them are certainly opposed by the existing governments (e.g. the conversion of secular state to Islamic state in Indonesia, the establishment of independent Islamic states in the Philippines and Thailand). The rest could be discussed. As experienced in the past, the groups may provide concessions if the governments are also willing to provide some concessions. Thus, there is a space to deal with the existing gaps or, at the very least, to improve the situation. The civil societies could play imperative roles in bridging the gaps, particularly institutional gaps—the gap between state-imposed institutions vis-à-vis community's "traditional" institutions (or the violent groups' "proposed" institutions) on one hand, and the gap between communities' institutions on the other.

b. The Greed/Economic Issue

The grievance approach is not sufficient to explain the phenomenon of free-riding in the rebellion, terror-for-ransom, full-time "terror-workers", etc. Hence, this study, looks at from another perspective, namely the greed/economic issue. In this regard, a terrorism expert, Rohan Gunaratna, maintains that "money is the terrorist's lifeblood" (*Time*, 6 Oct 2003). This work finds that Gunaratna's observation is not exaggerating in the JI and ASG cases of Indonesia and the Philippines respectively, as the table below shows.

Table 4. Terror Financing in Indonesia and the Philippines

Indonesia[18]	The Philippines[19]
Money funnelled by Al Qaeda to JI	**Money funnelled by Al Qaeda to the ASG**
Al Qaeda to Hambali (I) = US$ 30,000	Jamal Khalifa to ASG = P160,000
Al Qaeda to Hambali (II) = US$ 100,000	Jamal Khalifa to ASG = P6,000,000
Al Qaeda to JI (1995) = Rp 250 million	Al Qaeda to ASG = Est. $3,000,000
Al Qaeda to JI (1997) = Rp 400 million	
Al Qaeda to JI (2000) = Rp 700 million	**In-country fundraising**
Omar al-Faruq to JI = US$ 200,000	*a. Main Kidnappings:*
M Jabarah to JI = US$70,000	Sipadan kidnapping = at least US$10,000,000
Hambali was captured with his US$70,000	Ten journalists kidnapping = US$25,000
	Three journalists kidnapping = Est. US$5,500,000
In-country fundraising	Palawan kidnapping = at least US$330,000 (for
Jewellery shop robbery in Serang (Banter) = Rp 6 million and 4.5 kilograms of gold	G. Burnham) + P5 million (Kimberly Jao Uy)
Lippo bank robbery in Medan = Rp 113 million	
Local govt fund robbery in Poso = Rp 490 million	*b. Others*
Jewellery shop robbery in Pasar Tua (Palu) = n/a	Extortion, blackmail = n/a
Jewellery shop robbery in Monginsidi (Palu) = n/a	Taxing businessmen, farmers, teachers, etc[20]
	Marijuana cultivation & sale of *shabu* = n/a
Expenditures[21]	
Bali bombing I = Est. Rp 80 million	**Expenditures:**[22]
JW Marriot bombing = Est. Rp 80 million	New teenage recruits in Basilan = P5,000/person
Australian embassy bombing = Est. Rp 80 million	New recruits in Jolo/Sulu = P50,000/person
Others = n/a	Others = n/a

Note: The currency at that time was about Rp 10,000 and P42 to the US dollar in Indonesia and the Philippines respectively.

Some of JI funds mentioned above are maybe overlapped while others are untraceable. But it is clear that huge money was funneled by al Qaeda to JI. With such flow of money, *Time* argued that Al Qaeda was subcontracting its "projects" to JI (*Time*, Oct. 05, 2003). To raise more funds, JI also carried out in-country fundraising activities through robberies, as seen in the table. In total, regional intelligence officials estimated that "at one point in 2002 Hambali had as much as $500,000" (*Time*, Oct. 06, 2003). The "business" size of JI was however outnumbered by that of the ASG. While JI ran hundreds of thousands of dollars "business", the ASG ran multi-millions of dollars "business", drawing from foreign sources (Al Qaeda), kidnappings, drug trafficking, extortion, blackmail, and taxing peasants, fishermen, coconut growers, businessmen, and teachers (Ressa 2003, Bale 2003).

In regard to the greed issue in the Abu Sayyaf movement, Maria Ressa, a Filipino journalist, maintained that "the Abu Sayyaf began making money from everyone—starting with journalists. I saw the learning curve and the greed of the Abu Sayyaf grow" (Ressa 2003:113). One defector of the ASG, Ahmad Sampang (pseudonym), maintained that during its formative years, the ASG received a lot of support from foreign sources. "Even our uniforms came from abroad. We were even issued bulletproof vest," said Sampang. He admitted that in the past the ASG members kidnapped people because they did not have enough money to buy arms, bullets, and food. Realising the group's orientation later changed, Sampang left the ASG. He said "I left because the group lost its original reason for being. The activities were…for personal gratification. We abducted people…for money" (in Torres Jr. 2001:41). He left the ASG in December 1998, thus he realised this before a series of high profile kidnappings in 2000-2001 (see Table 1). An American woman, Gracia Burnham, who had been kidnapped for more than a year since May 27, 2001,

observed that "the bottom line was money" behind the ASG kidnappings (in Ressa 2003:111; see also Burnham 2003).

In the Thai case, there are only intelligence reports mentioning that "The southern Thailand insurgents are being funded by the Saudi Arabia-based Islamic fundamentalist Wahhabi movement…" *(World Politics Watch,* 07.04.2007*).* Another report says an association of Thai students in Indonesia (PMPIT), "takes care of the finances of the insurgency" through its fundraising activities overseas (*Bangkok Post*, 07.04.2007). However, there is no hard evidence on the exact amount of money used to finance the terror attacks. What is clear, by assessing that they used cars and motorcycles as bomb carriers, got constant supply of explosives, weapons, and bullets, and received commando-style training courses in the jungle or plantations, they certainly need funds. This is the case as a professional bomb maker confessed that he charged 2000-5000 baht per bomb to the militants since 2004 until his captured in July 2007 (*The Strait Times*, 18 July 2007).[23] The availability of fund can also be understood from the statement of PULO leaders (in Malaysia and Sweden) who offered a bounty of 90,000 baht (US$2,250) to those who killed any governors and prominent officials of Pattani, Yala, and Naratiwat (Gunaratna, Acharya, and Chua 2005:83). In addition, BRN-C has five units, and one of them is economic and financial affairs unit whose main task is to collect and manage funds.

In short, money plays important roles for the ASG and JI in carrying out their operations. It is not exaggerating to say that money is lifeblood for their activities. The difference is that while the ASG wrapped their silent force of greed within the discourse of grievance, JI seemed to use the money for its operation and for the costs of members' personal living. In the Thai case, it is certain that they need funds to finance their operation. Whether the funds are also used for living costs are unclear.

Disrupting financial networks in the *terror* financing is the responsibility of the state. If the perpetrators of the violence are full-time "workers" in resorting violence, besides it is the state's responsibility to bring jobs, it is the responsibility of the civil societies to carry out economic empowerment to ensure that ones would not rely on terror "projects" to cover their living costs.

c. Beyond Greed and Grievance: The Ideology of Violence

Grievances and greed arguments have problems in explaining non-state groups' actions relating to terrorism or terror attacks more comprehensively. One important point of departure that can be used in this regard is by looking at suicide bombing phenomenon in the Indonesian case.

When the field coordinator of the 2002 Bali bombing, Imam Samudra, mentioned that JI employed suicide bombers, no one believed his statement as it never happened before. As time passed, based on forensic evidences, it was clear that the bombings were carried out by two suicide bombers. This announcement was shocking many government officials, analysts, observers, experts, and religious leaders. Later, suicide bombings in Indonesia turned to be usual, as seen in the following table.

Table 5. Suicide Bombers in Indonesia[24]

Date	Targets	Suicide Bombers	Location	Victims
12 October 2002	Bar, Night Club (Bali Bombing I)	Feri (aka Isa)	Paddy's Club, Bali	202 people dead, 317 injured.
		Iqbal	Sari Club, Bali	
5 Agustus 2003	Hotel	Asmar Latin Sani	J.W. Marriott Hotel, Jakarta	14 people dead, 132 people injured.

9 September 2004	Embassy	Heri Golun	Australian Embassy, Kuningan, Jakarta	11 people dead, tens injured.
1 October 2005	Café (Bali Bombing II)	Misno (aka Wisnu aka Yanto)	Benega Café, Bali	23 people dead, 148 people wounded
		Muhammad Salik Firdaus	Nyoman Café, Bali	
		Ayib Hidayat	R'Ajas Café, Bali	

It is interesting to understand what kind of thing driving such action. This can be traced from the statement made by Imam Samudra after he received the death sentence. *Sydney Morning Herald* (SMH) reported the case of Imam Samudra:

> Sentenced to death for his role in the nightclub attack in October 2002 by the Al-Qaeda-linked Jemaah Islamiah terror network that killed 202 people, he said he does not fear facing a firing squad. 'It's the key to paradise, everything will be very, very nice,' he told Sydney radio station 2UE from his prison cell in remarks broadcast yesterday. He believed paradise held the promise of 72 virgins for single men, but only 23 if a man had been married on earth, as he has. 'We kill to get peace,' said Samudra, adding that his message to the United States and Australia - which lost 88 citizens in the Bali bombing - was 'I win' (SMH 15.04.2004).[25]

The findings reveal that the other driving force that drive JI, ASG, RKK (and some other new generation of insurgents) to carry out terror attacks or terror related actions in Indonesia, the Phlippines, and Thailand respectively are summarised in the following table.

Table 6. The Ideology of Violence in the Researched Countries

JI (Indonesia)[26]	ASG (The Philippines)[27]	RKK, etc (Thailand)[28]
Ideology of violence		
a. Violent Jihadism: - Global (primary) - Local (secondary)	a. Violent Jihadism: - Local (primary) - Global (secondary)	a. Violent Jihadism: - Local
b. *Takfir* (excommunication, enemizing perceived infidels): - America and its allies. - Non-believers (particularly Christians). - The existing (secular) government. - Believers (certain Muslims who are believed to undermine the religion and its perceived ideal practices).	b. *Takfir* (excommunication, enemizing perceived infidels): - The existing (secular) government. - Non-believers (particularly Catholics). - America and its allies. - Believers (some Muslims who betray, oppose or do not support the struggle).	b. *Takfir* (excommunication, enemizing perceived infidels): - The existing (secular) govt. - Non-believers (particularly Buddhists). - Believers (Muslims who collaborate or work for the government [*munafik*/hypocrite] and betray, oppose, or 'uncooperated' in the struggle [*murtad*/apostate]).
Incentive Expectation		
Dying as a martyr	Dying as a martyr	Dying as a syahid (martyr)
Go to paradise	Dying as a holy warrior	Dying as *Wira Shuhada* (army of martyrdom)
"Dear my brother and wife, God willing, when you see this re-cording I'll already be in heaven".	"Ride on a white horse to heaven when […] die"	"When martyrs are killed, they are not dead but alive next to God"
Get married or become a bridegroom (in heaven)	Go to heaven	"They [the *munafiks*] will not be welcomed in heaven."
Marry 72 virgins for a single man (23 for a married man)		Marry 72 virgins.[29]

Thus, the ideology of violence is an important driving force. It has been used to justify their terror attacks or violent acts. In this ideology, there are two interconnected notions used by such groups (JI, ASG, RKK), namely violent jihadism and *takfir* (enimizing perceived infidels, and therefore they could become a legitimate target). If they only used one of them (i.e. the former), it would not lead to terror attack as *jihad fi sabillillah* (jihad in the path of God) is allowed in a declared war against the combatants. If the latter (*takfir*) is incorporated into the former, the target would be mostly civilians. Moreover, in the views of the militants, incentives believed to receive after-life for their actions are instrumental in providing motivation.

It is interesting to note that Muslims could also become the targets. This work however finds different treatment to them by such groups. In the Indonesian case, they would target Muslims who are believed undermining the religion. JI operatives, for instance, had targeted Ulil Abshar Abdalla (activist of Liberal Islam Network, JIL) and even Megawati Soekarnoputri (before she was President) to be assassinated, but failed to realize due to some reasons. Imam Samudra tried to avoid Muslim casualties, but if they got killed in the blast it was their destinies, like a collateral damage. He even said sorry to the families of Muslim casualties in the 2002 Bali bombing (Imam Samudra 2004). But the ensuing bombings by JI continued to kill many Muslims. The ASG under Abdurajak Janjalani was known of protecting and helping Muslims. After his death and when Abu Sabaya threatened Christians and urged Muslims to remove all crosses in Basilan, a former ASG member, Ahmad Sampang, said that "It is not right anymore… If only Abdurajak were still alive, he would not allow it. Innocent Muslims will be affected" (in Torres Jr 2001:39). The ASG under Khadaffy Janjalani also protected Muslims, for instance, by releasing Muslims who were kidnapped by mistake (e.g. in the kidnapping of 52 teachers and students in Tumahubong, Basilan, in March 2000). However, they would try to kill the defectors (perceived traitors) of the ASG, as Sampang confessed that at one time Abu Sabaya's group went to his house and tried to kill him, but "I was able to escape" (in Torres Jr 2001:42). The ASG also hated a Muslim congressman Abdulgani "Gerry" Salapudin, a former MNLF Commander. Sampang said, in the past, "he did not help us. We asked him once to give us at least a few sacks of rice. But he failed us. We cannot kill him because he has a lot of armed men" (in Torres Jr 2001:39-42).

In the Thai case, however, it is totally different. While JI and the ASG would mostly try to avoid Muslim casualties (if killed, it seems to be like a collateral damage), the new generation of insurgents in Thailand intentionally targeted many Muslims who worked for the government, opposed their deeds and ideology, or "uncooperated" with them. This contributed to the fact that between January 2004 and August 2006 more Muslims have been killed than Buddhists in the recent violence in Thailand.[30] One of its ideological explanations can be found in a captured document entitled *Berjihad di Pattani* (Waging Jihad in Pattani). This booklet stimulated debate concerning whether it advocates Sufism (*Shafhi'i*) or Salafism/ Wahabbism. Although the booklet in projecting the future state governed by The Council of Constitution and Traditional Custom of the State of Pattani proposes that "for the stability and efficiency of the administration, the council must consists of *Ulama* from the *Shafi'i* school of jurisprudence only" and "never should you include other schools of jurisprudence or other community" (Ismuljaminah 2002:142), it advocates *shuhada* (martyrdom), implores the new generation as Jihad Warrior or Young Warrior of *Shaheed* (martyr), and particularly impose the notion of *takfir* (excommunication, enemizing perceived infidels, etc) which is a standard theme used by salafi jihadists. The booklet labels the believers who collaborate or cooperate with the Thai

government as *munafiks* (the hypocrites), and provides theological justification and instructions to treat disbelievers and the hypocrites as enemies. According to the booklet, the hypocrites "are the most dangerous enemies" and "let us come together to fight and eradicate them until we are safe from their disturbances" (Ismuljaminah 2002:125-126). Moreover, it not only "forbids from electing the hypocrites as leaders" but also "forbids the believers from offering prayers for the dead hypocrites and from standing at their graves to offer prayer" (Ismuljaminah 2002:126). As the booklet was found in the dead body of the insurgents in the Krue Ze mosque siege, one may say that it was only used by such insurgents. However, Sugunnasil argued that its significance "extends beyond the light it sheds on this group of Muslim militants. *Berjihad di Pattani* is the only authentic and detailed statement of radical Muslim militant views in the deep South currently available" (Sugunnasil 2007:118). This is the case, as what happened recently is traceable to such notion. In other words, one may "understand" why the militants not only killed Buddhists but also Muslims. One may also find the red tape on why the "insurgents have targeted fellow Muslims who receive a government salary, Muslim clerics who support the government or who perform funeral rites for *murtad* (apostates), and teachers who work in schools that have mixed curricula," on why the insurgents "warn people not to work on Friday, and to observe it as a day of prayer, or to risk death or the amputation of ears", on why they "warn people not to send their children to state-run schools", and on why they "warn everyone not to destroy the leaflets that carry the warnings" (Abuza 2006). In my interviews, two social scientists from the South (Muslim and Thai scientists) confirmed the killing of Muslims by militants. Both said that many of them were directly shot dead by militants without prior warnings, but many also were previously given death threats or warnings by sending or placing white fabric, white eggs, white rice, etc in the verandas or front yards of their houses as a symbol of death (funeral) (Interviews, April 2007).

The majority of Muslims in Thailand, the Philippines, and Indonesia, are moderate. They, including religious leaders, do not agree with the deeds and the ideology used by JI, the ASG, and RKK to justify their terror attacks or violent acts. In the Thai case for instance, in responding the militants' ideology of violence, fifteen experts on the Qur'an appointed by the Office of the Sheikul-Islam (*Chularajmontri*) advocated that *Berjihad di Patani* is "not a religious work, but simply a political pamphlet or militant handbook." They regard *Berjihad di Patani,* particularly its doctrine of jihad and the accusation of *munafik* for Muslims who work for the government as "equally preposterous and dangerously misleading." Moroever, a leading member of the Central Islamic Committee of Thailand stated that "*Berjihad di Pattani* is not a Qur'an. It is not even an Islamic textbook, or *keetab*. It is in fact a manual for outcast warriors to mobilise popular support in order to destroy Islam…Whoever possessed or came across copies of the book should burn them right away." Another member said that "in the Qur'an, a jihad is committed to protect Islam. It is not to harm others in the name of God" (in Sugunnasil 2007:129-131). Similar responses are observed in the Philippines in relation to the ASG. Dr. Aziri Abubakar and Prof. T. Jacub disagreed with the ideology used by Abu Sayyap to justify their violent and brutal acts (Interviews, 5 January 2007 and 2 February 2007). This is the case, as Prof. Julkipli Wadi observed, the majority of Muslims in Mindanao are moderate (Interview, 12 January 2007). In addition, the MILF and MNLF leaders condemned the deeds of the ASG (kidnap-for-ransom and beheadings) as un-Islamic. In the Indonesian case, one of Nahdatul Ulama (NU) leaders, Andi Djamaro, said that "they could not claim that they acted in the name of Islam, since

they could not find relevant passage (*dalil*) to kill someone [innocent people]." When he was asked whether a suicide bomber would die as a martyr, he replied, "dying as a martyr or not is determined by God," meaning not by human beings. Chairman of Muhammadyah, Din Syamsuddin, said that "suicide bombing [in Indonesia] contradicts with Islam and it is proscribed *(haram)*… If they use Al Quran verses, it is merely because of a misunderstanding in interpreting the verses or they use them partially" for their own cause. He added "suicide bombings had been forbidden since long time ago by Indonesian Islamic Council (MUI), Muhammadyah, and other Islamic organisations" (*Suara Merdeka*, 18 Nov. 2005).

The Networks: Actual and Virtual Networks

The networks can be distinguished into actual network and virtual network. The actual network itself can be divided into internal network and external network. The findings of the actual networks of such groups in Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand are summarised in the following table.

Table 7. Actual Networks in the Researched Countries[31]

1.	**Internal Networks**	**Intra-Organisational links**	**In-country links**
a.	JI (Indonesia)	*Wakalah* (district-based organisation) I Surakarta, *Wakalah* II West Java, *Wakalah* III Central Java, *Wakalah* IV East Java, *Wakalah* V Southern Sumatra, *Wakalah* VI Northern Sumatra, Cell in Sulawesi, Cell in Malaysia, Cell in Mindanao, Cell in Singapore, Cell in Cambodia	Ngruki Network, Kompak, Laskar Jundullah, NII, freelance *mujahid*
b.	ASG (the Philippines)	Basilan-based ASG (Khaddafi Janjalani), Jolo-based ASG (Commander Robot), Maguindanao-based ASG, ASG lost commands	MNLF lost command, MILF lost command (Pentagon group)
c.	RKK (Thailand)	BRN-C (parent organisation), Pemuda (youth wing of BRN-C), *Pejuangs* (BRN-C's loose network with broader village-based insurgents).	GMIP, Pusaka, Bersatu, PULO/New PULO, Jamaah Salafi
2.	**External Networks**	**Types of Links**	
a.	JI-Al Qaeda	Financial network, personal network, training (Afghanistan, Poso)	
b.	JI-ASG	Personal network, training [AFP estimated that more than two dozens of JI members had been working with the ASG in Basilan and Sulu]	
c.	JI-RKK	No hard evidence. JI attempted to build cell in Thailand, but there is no evidence on the existence of an active JI cell in Southern Thailand. Some RKK operatives are reportedly trained in Bandung and Medan by Indonesian militants (not necessarily by JI members). Thai students association in Indonesia (PMIPIT) is reported to play role in overseas fundraising and in facilitating training and recruitment of RKK operatives and other militant insurgents.	
d.	ASG-Al Qaeda	Financial network, personal network, training (Afghanistan, Basilan)	
e.	RKK-ASG/Al Qaeda	No evidence	

Based on the above table, any group has its own networks, either directly or indirectly, and either the network's partners are allies, supporters, sympathisers, or only having a shared goal or concern. Network is resources; thus, by having network the group could access certain resources, either human resources, financial resources, technological resources, or just a hiding place. They could also strengthen and nurture their shared ideology through such network.

The findings have demonstrated how importance the ideology is. The shared ideology of violence adhered by militants could continue to cement the concerned members or persons although such networks are destroyed by intelligence officials or security apparatus. By observing the groups' networks in the researched countries,

another type of network—virtual network—played considerable roles in the JI case. Discouragements to commit terror attacks have been carried out by many Indonesian religious leaders. Abu Bakar Baa'syir even released a "fatwa": "Don't do bombing in Indonesia." However, according to one security analyst, Noor Huda Ismail**,** "his 'fatwa' discouraging violence in Indonesia has not been well received by fringe young and impassioned jihadi recruits. Young jihadists have instead turned to the Internet to download fatwas from mainly Middle Eastern jihadists, including fatwas from the late Jordanian born Zarqawi and a jailed Saudi Arabian cleric, Al Maqdisi."[32]

ICG identified that since the 2002 Bali bombing, the terror groups have reached the third generation and they are currently not necessarily under JI structural commands. Abdullah Sonata, for instance, denied his membership with JI. He instead declared himself and his cohort as "*mujahid* freelance" (freelance mujahidin), meaning their movement is leaderless or under a leaderless organization. One former member of JI from Central Java confirmed that Sonata is indeed not a member of JI. It is also interesting to note that "about 18 '*mujahid* freelance' have been under detention" (*Tempo,* 17-23 October 2005). How did a leaderless movement build its network? Beside through personal contacts and friendships, the role of virtual network is of importance. In fact, two of Sonata group's members are internet savvy, who were tasked—besides to communicate with Dulmatin in the Philippines via email—to communicate with the world via websites. By tracing the JI case, it is also no doubt that Imam Samudra is internet minded. He spent a lot of his time surfing jihadi websites and chatting with persons who have the same views with him. After the Bali bombing, he extensively communicated with other JI members via email and monitored post-Bali bombing case via websites. He was captured with his laptop and the investigators found a material for his future website (www.istimata.com, a planned domain) claiming responsibilities for the Bali attacks, expressing his violent ideology, stating 13 reasons for the attack, and warning America and its allies[33] concerning the future attacks (see Adisaputra 2006, Imam Samudra 2004). Two JI-linked lecturers from Semarang (Central Java), Agung Prabowo and Agung Setiadi also made a website (www.anshar.net) for Noordin M. Topp, which was used to post their ideology of violence and news of Noordin's activities as well as to communicate with other jihadists. In jail, Iman Samudra was also able to communicate with other jihadists, as well as with Agung Prabowo and Agung Setiadi, and posted his views in www.anshar.net via a laptop smuggled to him.[34] This shows that they have built and used virtual networks to communicate with the world for their cause.

The ineffectiveness of the discouragements by religious leaders and their choices to trust the internet shows how effective the internet in keeping the movement, although it is a paradox as they are well known as anti-Western. The improved security of the internet to keep certain message hidden and the ease access of using it would continue to be used by violent groups to build and maintain their network as well as to nurture their ideology. Because of this, "this may be part of the explanation for how in the last seven years JI has shown resilience as a clandestine organization and demonstrated an ability to adapt to internal rifts and crackdowns by the authorities."[35] The ease use and access of internet matter, as one jihadist maintained that "the sprawling and anarchic nature of web makes it easy to operate: Just put up a site, run it until it is closed down, and then put it up again somewhere else."[36] Thus, even if the organizations of JI and other terror groups could be cracked down by security and intelligence officials, leaderless jihadists could still find their own way to further their goals through virtual network.

With such kind of network, the terror groups could easily build communities look like what Ben Anderson called "imagined communities." However, the "imagined communities" here are not related to a sense of ethnicity, but a sense of religiosity where the ideology of violence is used to cement the concerns of such communities. This kind of network is more difficult to deal with compared to the actual network as its drive located in the minds of individuals. This is a challenge to the civil societies advocating peace or to those who work for a more peaceful world.

Conclusion

While Asia has promisingly transformed itself toward political maturity and/or economic advancement, it faces imminent threats that could undermine its current and future advancements, either locally or regionally. One of the threats is non-state groups' actions in the form of terrorism or terror attacks. Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand are countries in Southeast Asia that have suffered from such actions. In fact, in certain countries or conflict-prone areas the basic security of human kinds, namely their safety, is seriously threatened. The attacks could kill everyone regardless of their areas of origins, ethnicities, religions, and socio-economic status.

Such non-state groups' actions have their own origins. In the Philippine and Thai cases, they are originated from a dispute of the claimed areas (those of the Sultanate of Sulu/Maguindanao and the Sultanate of Pattani respectively). Insurgencies attempting to regain the perceived lost areas and creating an independence state led to the emergence of groups that used terror attacks to further their goals. In the Indonesian case, terrorism is originated from a strong passion to create a perceived ideal state. The recent lethal attacks are however strongly related to US policies and actions in world politics.

The grievance explanation is insufficient to explain such non-state groups' actions phenomenon. As well, the greed explanation has some limitations in doing so. In fact, the ideology of violence used to justify their actions considerably contributed to terror-related non-state groups' actions in such three countries.

While the group's actual network is vulnerable to the security apparatus, the virtual network is more resilient since the core force in this network lies in the minds of individuals, cemented with a shared ideology of violence. The use of this type of network has been observed in the Indonesian case. In the future, the network could contribute to the establishment of a wider leaderless movement with its own "imagined communities." It is not exaggerating therefore to say that the members of such "imagined communities" could carry out independent terror attacks without the command of, or be tied to, certain actual organisations.

Due to the complexity of the problems, multi-dimensional efforts should be carried out to overcome such problems aiming at improving human security in the region. The use of non-conventional approach (non-military approach) should be given emphasis, particularly through investment in education, economic empowerment, and the promotion of religious tolerance. The consideration to give emphasis on non-military approach is because the ideology matters.

Endnotes

[1] United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, http://www.unodc.org/unodc/terrorism_definitions.html.

[2] John A. Sterling, *Terrorism, Technology, and Tyranny,* http://www.lawandliberty.org/terroris.htm.

[3] In the discourse on terrorism related to insurgency, there are the terms like "nationalist separatist terrorism," "insurgent terrorism" (Reinares 2005), "insurgent movement that utilizes terrorist tactic" (Sinai 2005:218), and "guerrilla terrorism" or "'urban guerrilla' terrorism" (Laqueur 2004:27). Concerning the issue of how the two social phenomena—terrorism and insurgency/national liberation movement—are associated, Laqueur suggested that "movement of national liberation and social revolution have [often] turned to terrorism after political action failed. But terrorism has also been the first resort, chosen by militant groups impatient for quick results" (Laqueur 1999:36).

[4] A number of studies discussing grievance-driven terrorism can also be found in the analysis of the root causes of terrorism. See Bjorgo *ed.* (2005), Barreveld (2001), Sinai (2005).

[5] The exact figure of Indonesia's total population in 2005 is 208,819,860 people, consisting of 182,083,594 Muslims, 12,964,795 Christians/Protestants, 6,941,884 Catholics, 4,586,754 Hindus, and 2,242,833 Buddhist (including those adhering *Kong Hu Cu*) (BPS 2005).

[6] The Muslim majority provinces in Southern Thailand comprise of Pattani, Yala, Naratiwat, and Satun. Songkhla is also part of Southern Thailand but the Muslims are relatively minority. The total Muslim population in the respective provinces in 1982 compared to 2000 are: Pattani (77% in 1982 : 80.7% in 2000), Yala (78%:68.9%), Naratiwat (63%:82%), Satun (66%:67.8%), Songkhla (19%:23.2%). Source: National Statistical Office of Thailand 1982, 2000 (see YCCI 2006).

[7] See Bambang Abimayu (2005, 2006), Nasir Abas (2005), Imam Samudra (2002), Greg Barton (2005), Asep Adisaputra (2006), Bambang Abimayu (2005, 2006),

[8] See Maria Ressa (2003); Marites Dangulan Vitug and Glenda M. Gloria (2000); Zachary Abuza (2005); C. James Castro, Ian S. Alabanza, and Benedict Dilag (2000); Rosalinta Tolibas-Nunez (1997).

[9] See B Raman (2005); Rohan Gunaratna, Arabinda Acharya, and Sabrinda Chua (2005), *The Age* (15 April 2007), *Time* (19 July 2007), *The Nation* (13 August 2007, 17 October 2005), Human Rights Watch (2007).

[10] Nasir Abas (2005), Asep Chaerudin (2003), Greg Barton (2005), Asep Adisaputra (2006), Zachary Abuza (2003, 2003b), Maria Ressa (2003), Bambang Abimayu (2005, 2006),

[11] Interview with Aziri Abubakar (5 January 2007), Arnold M. Azurin (3 January 2007), Aboud Lingga (2 February 2007). See also Maria A Ressa (2003), Samuel K. Tan (1995), Patricio P. Diaz (2003); Peter G Gowing and Robert D McAmis (1974), Gracia Burnham (2003), Dirk Barreveld (2001), Jose Torres Jr (2001), Macapado Abaton Muslim (1994), Hashim Salamat (2001, 2004), Al Haj Murad (2001), Abinales and Amoroso (2005), Al-Gazel Rasul *ed.* (1999), McKenna (1999), Arnold Molina Azurin (1996), Julkipli Wadi (1999), Cesar Adib Majul (1999), Samuel K. Tan (1999), Larry Niksch (2002), Gomez Jr (2000).

[12] A. Teeuw and D.K. Wyatt (1970), David K. Wyatt (2003), Ibrahim Syukri (1985), W.K. Che Man (1990), Michael Gilquin (2002), NRC (2006).

[13] Interviews with various persons in Thailand, social scientists, and journalists of the Thai Journalist Association (name withheld), April 2007. See also *Bangkok Post* and *The Nation* (March-July 2007), *HRW* (November 16, 2006), and HRW (2007). BRN (*Barisan Revolusi National*, National Revolution Front) was established in 1961. In the course of its development, some factions emerged due to conflict of interests. Its three main factions are BRN-Congress, BRN-Ulama, and BRN-Coordinate (BRN-C). BRN-C has five units, namely political work and recruitment, youth wings (*Pemuda*), women affairs, economic and financial affairs, and village-based army wing (commando-style *Runda Kumpulan Kecil*, RKK). The village-based RKK consists of less than 10 members working underground in a cell-like structure. In June 2003, the RKK was active in 500 villages and BRN-C had more than 4000 *Pemuda* members. In addition, BRN-C has a loose cell-based network with a broader village-based separatist militants called themselves *Pejuang Kemerdekaan Patani* (Pattani Freedom Fighters, here abbreviated as PKP) while local people usually called them *pejuangs* (fighters). By February 2005, the SBPPBC estimated that "separatist militants had infiltrated and established control of 875 out of the total 1,574 villages in the southern border provinces." Recently (2007), "Thai authorities have estimated that well-trained separatist militants have established cell-like units (each cell has five to eight members) in two-thirds of the 1,574 villages across the southern border provinces, while there are now more than 7,000 *pemuda* (youth) members of BRN-Coordinate. There is a high degree of operational autonomy in each village—leaders at the village level are able to decide when, where, and whom to attack." (HRW 2007:8). The PKP is a generic term used by a new generation of insurgents and it serves as a common poll. Therefore, the RKK also belongs to the PKP, and in fact, RKK members are recruited from the PKP. Many *pejuangs* (PKP) are not the members of BRN-C; some are affiliated to the youth wings of

other separatist organisations and some of them simply joined the struggle as retaliation for their dead, missing, or detained family members, or due to a shared cause. RKK and *pejuangs* (PKP) are a spearhead in the current spate of violence, but not all *pejuangs* attacked civilians.

[14] Imam Samudra (2004), Abu Bakar Ba'asyir (2005), Tim Peduli Tapol (1985), Edi Sudarjat (2005), Nazir Abas (2005), Asep Adisaputra (2006), ICG (2002, 2002b, 2003), *Suara Merdeka*, 18 Nov. 2005.

[15] Interview with Aziri Abubakar (5 January 2007), Carmen Abubakar (12 January 2005), Arnold M. Azurin (3 January 2007), Prof. T Jacub (29 January 2007), Aboud Lingga (2 February 2007), Nasser Gayagay (1 February 2007), Prof. Arin (5 April 2007), Robert Panaguiton (24 January 2007), Hezekian Conception (25 January 2007), Fr. Angel Calvo (29 January 2007), etc. See also Patricio P. Diaz (2003); Peter G Gowing and Robert D McAmis (1974), Cesar Adib Majul (1999), Gracia Burnham (2003), Dirk Barreveld (2001), Jose Torres Jr (2001), Macapado Abaton Muslim (1994), Arnold Molina Azurin (1996), ICG (2004), Gomez Jr (2000), HDN (1995).

[16] Interview with Dr. Wittaya (21 March 2007), Srisompob Jitpiromsi (9 April 2007), Worawith Baru (9 April 2007), Giles Ji Ungpakorn (12 March 2007), Haji Ahmad (27 March 2007), Faizal (27 March 2007), Prof. Arin (5 April 2007), discussion in the workshop of Peace Jurnalism organised by Thai Journalists Association (24-25 March 2007), etc. See also Janchitfah (2004), ICG (2005, 2007), Imtiyaz Yusuf and Lars Peter Schmidt (2006).

[17] Demographic shift in Mindanao, Moro:Non-Moro: a) 1903: 76%:24%, b) 1980: 23%:77%

[18] See Rohan Gunaratna (2002), Zachary Abuza (2003b), Time (5-6 October 2003), Muhammad and Sulistyo [eds] 2006), *Kompas*, 21 Juni 2003; *Suara Merdeka* (4 November 2003, 2 February 2007).

[19] See Maria Ressa (2003), Gracia Burnham (2003), Rohan Gunaratna (2002), Zachary Abuza (2003b), Berry *et.al.* (2002:104,115), Jose Torres Jr. (2001:39), Bale (2003), *Philippine Daily Inquirer* (22 Jan 2007).

[20] In regard to taxing businessmen, in the early 1990s, the ASG taxed "P5,000 a month and several sacks of rice from each business establishment." But "sometimes they only give us rice," said Sampang (former member of the ASG) (Torres Jr. 2001:39). Concerning taxing teachers, during the leadership of Abdurajak Janjalani, any teacher should pay P50 per month. During Khaddafy Janjalani leadership, it had been raised to P200 per month per teacher (Ressa 2003, Torrer Jr 2001).

[21] Mukhlas, the field commander of the 2002 Bali bombing, testified that he had a budget of $30,5000 (Rp 300,500,000) for this bombing operation. This amount of money was used to buy a car as a bomb carrier by Amrozi (Rp 32,000,000) and bomb ingredients (one ton KCl03 Rp 11,000,000, and 50 kg aluminium powder and 50 kg sulphur Rp 3,250,000), to rent a house for one year (Rp 10,000,000), to buy a motorcycle for target survey (Yamaha Cripton Rp 7,500,000), and to rent a room (Rp 550,000). Thus, the total costs were so far Rp 64,300,000. As there were other expenses (the data is unavailable), like expenses for buying four filling cabinets for bomb storages, sending bomb ingredients from Surabaya to Bali (four times via bus of Gunung Harta) (Muhammad and Sulistyo [*eds.*] 2006), buying fuel, etc, I estimate the total expenditures were about Rp 80,000,000. Therefore, out of Rp 300,500,000 budget, there was remaining money of Rp 225,000,000. For the Marriott bombing, the price of the car used as a bomb carrier was Rp 25,750,000 (*Koran Tempo*, 29 Dec 2003). Supposed that the total expenditures in the Marriot bombing were similar to that of the Bali bombing (Rp 80,000,000), from a total budget of $30,000 (Rp 300,000,000), the remaining money was Rp 220,000,000. The type of car bomb used in the Australian Embassy (Kuningan) bombing was similar to those of in the Bali and Marriot bombings.

[22] In my interview with researcher who carried out psychological research and treatment to former child 'soldiers' of the ASG in Basilan and with Basilan government's employees and residents, besides receiving P50,000 for a group of 10 teenagers (P5,000 per person) when young members of the ASG were recruited, they received P1,000 per month per person. Their families were also given "economic assistance" for a few months (as long as the ASG had money) (Interviews in Zamboanga and Basilan, January 2007). The figure of P50,000/person as the recruitment incentive came from security official in Sulu (Ressa 2003).

[23] He was arrested with a bounty of 2 million baht. Army spokesman Mr Akkara said that the bomb maker, Manaseya, besides making money for the bombs sold to the insurgents, he also made extra money by providing classes in explosives manufacturing (*The Strait times*, 18 July 2007).

[24] In the Mc Donald bombing at Mall Ratu Indah Plaza (MaRi), Makassar, South Sulawesi, on 5 December 2002, some reports said that it was a suicide bombing because a witness, McDonald security staff (before he died in the hospital), stated that the bomber (Azhar Daeng Salam) was walking out from toilet without clothes (naked) with a package (wrapped in a plastic bag) in his hand. A few seconds later the 'package' exploded. But another report mentioned that the bomber was allegedly trapped and then killed in the bomb blast. In the blast, three people were killed (including the bomber

and the McDonald security staff) and eleven others wounded. See *Kompas*, 13 Nov 2003; *Tempo Interaktif*, 15 Aug. 2005.

[25]Similarly, Radio Netherland reported that "the mastermind [field coordinator] of Bali bombing, Imam Samudra, claimed to win after he received a death sentence. He added that he is no longer patient to its execution as he will go to heaven consisting of virgins, as a reward to kill Christians. According to him, his death sentence is a key to go to heaven and everything there will be very good. He believed that the heaven avails 72 virgins for a not-yet-married man and 23 virgins for a married man" (Radio Netherland 14.04.2004).

[26] Imam Samudra (2004), Ba'abduh (2005), Nazir Abas (2005), Asep Adisaputra (2006), *Sydney Morning Herald* (15 April 2004), *Radio Netherland* (14 April 2004), *Suara Merdeka* (18 November 2005). The quotation is a translation from the video statement made by one of the suicide bombers in the 2005 Bali bombing (in Syu'bah Asa 2005).

[27] See Greg William (2003), Jose Torres Jr (2001), Gracia Burnham (2003), Dirk Barreveld (2001). The quotation was from a young member of the ASG (in Jose Torres Jr. 2001:115).

[28] Interview with Srisompob Jitpiromsi and Worawit Baru (9 April 2007). See also Ismuljaminah (2002), Zachary Abuza, Sugunnasil (2007), Syu'bah Asa (2005). The first quotation is in *Berjihad di Pattani* (Ismuljaminah 2005:122). The second quotation implying that the *pejuangs* will go to heaven is a public warning (leaflet) originally written in Jawi (in HRW 2007:93). This warning was a response to Muslims' resistance and disagreement on the BRN-C recruitment expansion and violent activities.

[29] Interview with Thai social scientist in Southern Thailand whose specialization and research focus are on violent conflicts in the South (name withheld), April 2007. It should be noted that not all insurgents hold this view.

[30] This can be traced from the fact that the recent violence is "no longer confined to 'traditional' targets: state personnel and public installation," but civilians, both Buddhists and Muslims (Jitiromsi 2007:92-3). Human Right Watch (HRW), quoting a study released by the Thai Journalist Association and Prince of Songkhla University, maintained that "insurgent groups are responsible for most of the 5,460 violent incidents in the southern border provinces of Thailand between January 2004 and August 2006 which resulted in 1,730 deaths and 2,513 injuries." HRW further elucidated that "Civilians – including government employees and local officials – have been the principal targets of daily attacks, totalling 60 percent (or 1,873) of the victims, followed by police (16 percent, or 481), soldiers (12 percent, or 373), and others (12 percent, or 369)." Among these, "the majority of victims were Muslims; 924 Muslims were killed and 718 injured, compared with 697 Buddhists killed and 1,474 injured. The religion of the remaining victims is unknown" (*HRW*, November 16, 2006).

[31] Interview with Hezekian Conception (25 January 2007), Fr. Angel Calvo (29 January 2007), Herman Joseph Kraft (5 January 2007). See also Nasir Abas (2005), Zachary Abuza (2003b), Maria Ressa (2003), Gunaratna (2002), Gunaratna, Arabinda Acharya, and Sabrinda Chua (2005), *Time* (5-6 October 2003), Muhammad and Sulistyo [*eds.*] (2006), *Kompas* (21 June 2003); *Suara Merdeka* (4 November 2003, 2 February 2007).

[32] Noor Huda Ismail, "When Jihadists Go Online," *Jakarta Post*, 2 July 2007.

[33] Agung Setiadi was expert in hacking and carding. This banned website was also used to publish new targets like Ancol, Planet Hollywood, Senayan Golf Driving Range, and Jakarta Convention Center (JCC). See *Balipost* (24 August 2006, 26 August 2006).

[34] In his 13 reasons for the attack, Imam Samudra mentioned USA, Israel, UK, Australia, Germany, France, Russia, Japan, etc as American allies, and therefore, they are legitimate targets. In other interrogations, he mentioned Belgium and China (see Adisaputra 200). Although in the video statement broadcasted worldwide Noordin M Topp only warned USA, Australia, UK, and Italy, he had indeed targeted Japan-funded power plant in Surabaya (East Java, Indonesia) but failed to realize due to lack of available explosives. JI targeted Japan as, according to Imam Samudra, Japan sent its troops (Self-Defence Force) to Iraq. My interview with former intelligence chief and former Japan's ambassador for Israel and Russia, mentioned another reason, namely because of the capture of al-Qaeda operative in Japan, where the Japan authorities later extradited him to France (Interview, 22 November 2006).

[35] Noor Huda Ismail, "When Jihadists Go Online," *Jakarta Post*, 2 July 2007

[36] *Ibid.*

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