The ASEAN Way on Human Security

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Introduction

Human security is a new concept in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).[1] The region has been known for its long embedded state-centric security concept resulting from the post-colonial task in state-building and nation-building. The ASEAN Way, the governing principle of interstate relations in ASEAN, emphasizes on the state's absolute sovereignty and views the state as the sole referent subject of security. It was unimaginable that human security which began to gain momentum around the end of the Cold War would prosper here. However, the past decades witnessed the attitudinal change among ASEAN leaders. The serious social and economic backlashes from the 1997 Asian economic crisis prompted ASEAN to be more receptive towards human centric security norms. When Thailand proposed for the ASEAN Caucus on Human Security to be set up, human security entered the ASEAN dialogue for the first time. After the economic crisis, ASEAN faced the repercussions from another crisis: the transnational terrorism culminating in 9/11 event. It seemed that the security norms in ASEAN swung back to be state-centric once again.

The change in ASEAN security norms could be accounted for by exploring ASEAN multilateral track of diplomacy. The prevailing norms in the official track participated by ASEAN leaders and officials are state-centric. The unofficial track was originally designed to 'mirror' the official agendas; consequently, no difference existed until recently when there were more interactions with the non-governmental sectors. Thus, the role played by non-governmental sectors in advancing a more human-centric agenda in ASEAN is instrumental in accounting for the change in security norms. International pressure (from the United Nations or other countries which already subscribed to human security norms) which has been responsible in inducing changes towards more human-centric security concept in ASEAN is recognized. However, the role of the non-governmental sectors in changing ASEAN security norms will be given main focus. Although the debate among various schools concerning security concept is undeniably important, the article will only deal with it briefly only to provide background of how human security concept has emerged out of traditional one. To delve deeply into the debate requires the space of a book.

The Post-Cold War security environment and its implications on security studies

During the Cold War, there was a widespread – though by no means universal – consensus among international relations scholars that 'security' meant 'national security', i.e. ensuring the survival of the state.[2] With the end of the Cold War, security, conflict, and general threat definitions have become more diffuse and opaque, lacking the simple dichotomies of the Cold War era.[3] The threats highlighted by the Post-Cold War security environment (for instance, economic deprivation, food security, or environmental degradation) no longer presented direct challenges to states' sovereignty.[4] However, they gravely endangered human lives and well-being. States experienced these problems during the Cold War period, but other dimensions of security were absorbed under the greatest concern of national security in the face of

the two superpowers' rivalry. Moreover, the effect of globalization has also provided opportunities for new actors in international relations to equip themselves with force formerly monopolized by states. The threats posed by non-state actors (for example, drug syndicates, or human trafficking organizations) are usually directed at individuals rather than the state's integrity.

The end of the Cold War also witnessed the emergence of 'middle powers' whose roles in international politics used to be recognized as only supporters of the great powers and occasional mediators.[5] The middle powers have been developing beyond their historic role during the Cold War era and have collaborated with non-governmental organizations in filling the niches neglected by superpowers,[6] especially in the issue area concerning human well-being such as the ban on landmines, nuclear weapons, or child soldiers.[7] The promotion of human security issues constituted shared identities of these middle powers in the post-Cold War era.

Facilitated by the effect of globalization which provided unprecedented access to information and capacity to move and communicate at low cost,[8] non-governmental organizations aiming to propose alternatives to state-centric policy proliferated during this period and formed transnational network with other organizations with similar aims. The world has also witnessed growing incidents where states constituted the source of insecurity for their own citizens.[9] These incidents challenged the assumption that the state is the main protector of its people's security.

These developments highlight that security is, after all, a 'contested concept'. It is difficult to agree on a definition of the concept because no neutral definition is possible.[10] The changing security environment in the Post-Cold War era resulted in the idea that the traditional concept of security[11] was incapable of explaining emerging new threats by non-state actors who neither act in a rational manner (or always calculate that benefits would outweigh the costs), nor have the same structures as contemporary states.[12] The traditional concept of security cannot explain situations where the states themselves destroyed, rather than guaranteed, their citizens' security. Consequently, non-conventional security studies, aiming to broaden as well as deepen the security concept, began to gain ground. Attempts to broaden the concept from the sole focus on military terms to include other dimensions (political, economic and societal) of security actually existed before the 1990s, but they did not exceed the border of state-centric view on security.[13]

The Critical School emerged as a more satisfactory critique of traditional thinking about security by deepening the concept rather than only broadening it.[14] According to Smith, there are two main streams of critical thinking in security.[15] Krause and Williams encouraged various approaches to studying security as well as shift the focus from the military dimension of state behaviour to individuals, community, and identity.[16] The Welsh school, based on Ken Booth and Richard Wyn Jones' works[17] focuses on human emancipation defined by Booth as 'the freeing of people (as individuals and groups) from the physical and human constraints which stop them carrying out what they would freely choose to do.'[18] Wyn Jones saw that the interrelationship between security and emancipation is not the end of the journey towards the development of an improved conceptualization of security. Rather, it is

only a primary, yet important, step.[19] It is the critical school that leads the way towards viewing humans as a referent subject of security, the core characteristic of the concept of human security.

The concept of human security[20]

Human security recognizes that people's security is not only a means towards state's security. It shares the Critical School's dissatisfaction with the traditional security studies, especially the idea that the state is the sole referent of security. Threats make sense only in terms of the physical and moral injury they can inflict upon people and their livelihood.[21] Security policy is meaningless if it is not directed to protect, first and foremost, the people.

There is lack of consensus in terms of the concept's definition.[22] However, it can be said that two main camps of human security definitions exist: the 'narrow' camp focuses on freedom from fear,[23] while the 'broad' camp incorporates both freedom from fear and freedom from want.[24] The latter concurs with the view propelled by the 1994 UNDP Human Development Report, 'New Dimensions of Human Security', which is often cited as the most authoritative text regarding human security definition.[25]

Various interpretations of the concept lead to the most common criticism that human security includes desirable features in human life without any reservation, and therefore is useless as an analytical concept.[26] However, the broadness of human security concept allows flexibility in incorporating it into actual security policy, especially in states that have a strong tradition of a state-centric security approach such as ASEAN members. According to Acharya, 'human security is in itself a holistic paradigm; at least, it offers opportunities for creative synthesis and theoretical eclecticism.'[27] The concept has two distinctive features that mark it from the traditional state-centric approach to security and from other non-traditional approaches which already embrace other aspects of security apart from the military one. First, human security shifts the referent subject from states to individuals. According to Alagappa,

> rethinking security must begin with the referent, which is the fundamental element and which has consequences for the other three elements of security (the composition of core values, the type and nature of threats, and the approach to security) as well as for the nature of the domestic and international environment.[28]

Viewing humans as the ultimate referent subjects defies a conventional assumption that once the state is secured, the people will also be secured. The state can no longer be viewed as the sole provider of security for its citizens. Therefore, it becomes much harder for the state to use security defined in terms of state survival as an excuse to sacrifice human freedom and well-being.

Second, humans are placed under the security framework. The securitization of humans has important implication for states: sweeping 'human security' problems under the carpet would be more costly than when the same problems were under other frameworks such as developmental or economic. Human security aims to evoke

'emphatic, well-funded, and expert'[29] practices characteristic to national security threats responses.

Attempting to provide a tight and fully operationalized definition of human security is beyond the scope of the article. Human security will be used in this article to signify a framework for cooperation among states where humans are the primary referent subjects, and violent disruptions of their normal daily lives are addressed under the security policies. It will also follow the 'broad' route of human security definition.

Accounting for change: the role of multilateral 'tracked' diplomacy

The change in ASEAN security norms could be accounted for by examining how ASEAN multilateral diplomacy works. The formal channel, i.e. interactions among official representatives of governments, is known as 'Track I' diplomacy. Other dialogues taking place outside Track I, involving experts and governments' officials participating in their private capacities, are referred to as 'Track II'. 'Track III' referred to non-governmental sectors and independent academics with different agendas from what propelled by Track I and Track II.[30] Track I and Track II agendas are often similar due to the reliance of the latter on the former in terms of financial and political support.[31] Therefore, it is not surprising that comprehensive security, which regards the state as a referent of security, prevails throughout Track I and Track II dialogue, despite the slight move towards human security recently. On the other hand, non-governmental organizations (NGOs)[32] and scholars constituting Track III diplomacy have been trying to incorporate 'traditionally non-security concerns in the Asia-Pacific into the security discourse'.[33] Given that the main preoccupation of Track I and Track II is state-centric security, the meaningful way to account for the change in ASEAN's more receptive outlook on human security post-crises lies in Track III activities. Although actors in Track II diplomacy like the ASEAN Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ASEAN-ISIS) and the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP) are non-governmental in the sense that they represent unofficial channels for communication and are often referred to as non-governmental organizations (NGOs) by some scholars,[34] they are not part of independent Track III activities studied in this article.

. Studying ASEAN as if the organization incorporates homogenous members could be seen as simplistic. However, ASEAN members share a set of collective norms and identities which lie at the foundation of the organization. Although its core is founded upon conventional international norms embedded in the United Nations Charter, the ASEAN process also involves other codes of conduct quite unique to the organization which is termed 'the ASEAN Way'.[35] This will be discussed further in the section concerning human security in ASEAN before the 1997 economic crisis took place.

Theoretical framework

The importance of norms[36] is not ignored by rationalist approach including neo-liberal institutionalism, even though it recognizes norms only in the regulatory dimension.[37] However, Constructivism allows for a deeper understanding of norms in

shaping states' behaviours by explaining the constitutive effect of norms or how norms create identities, define and redefine interests.[38] For constructivists, socialization is thus a central concept.

Using rationalist approaches would be misleading in studying ASEAN. Firstly, the ASEAN Way, representing collective identities and norms, would be deemed irrelevant because it does not enshrine any concrete institutional or legal mechanisms which can be seen as 'regulating' behaviour. Secondly, rationalist approaches in assuming fixed interests as a given prevents the meaningful study of the change deriving from the socialization process.[39] Studying how collective security norms change over time is also made more difficult because of the emphasis put on material benefits. States that are fully socialized will not stop to calculate for benefits before displaying pro-norms behaviour. The ASEAN Way is internalized in ASEAN member countries, but this does not mean that it is fixed and unchangeable from the constructivist point of view.

The socialization process does not happen only through the interactions between the member states and the institution, but also from states' social interactions with non-governmental sectors aiming to persuade states to internalize alternative norms. The transnational nongovernmental agents, termed by Keck and Sikkink as transnational advocacy networks, are among the most important sources of new ideas, norms, and identities in the international system.[40]

Issues involving bodily harm to vulnerable individuals and legal equality of opportunity are most likely to be mobilized by the networks since they 'speak to aspects of belief systems or life experiences that transcend a specific cultural or political context.'[41] The characteristics of those issues fit perfectly into human security concept, making it the most salient characteristic of what the networks would want to advocate.

The analysis of human security norms in ASEAN will also be informed by the process of norm influence termed by Finnemore and Sikkink's as the norm 'life cycle'.[42] The first stage is 'norm emergence' whereby 'norm entrepreneurs' attempt to convince states to embrace new norms. The second stage, 'norm cascade', occurs where the socialized states which become 'norm leaders' attempt to socialize other states to be 'norm followers'. Finally, the last stage, the 'norm internalization' may or may not occur. If it does take place, the new norm will not be debated anymore and will be treated as the 'standard of appropriateness'.[43]

In order for an actor to be more easily persuaded, Johnston has suggested four 'ideal combinations' of social environments. The persuaders are most likely to succeed when

1) the actor is highly cognitively motivated to analyze counterattitudinal information (e.g. a very novel or potentially threatening environment);
2) the persuader is a highly authoritative member of a small, intimate, high effect in-group to which the also persuadee belongs or wants to belong;
3) the actor has few prior, ingrained attitudes that are inconsistent with the counterattitudinal message;
4) the agent is relatively autonomous from principal (e.g. when issue is technical or issue is ignored by principal).[44]

These criteria will be used to test against NGOs' attempts in proposing human security as alternative security norms in ASEAN. Taking the constructivist view and the importance of socialization in mind, the article will proceed to examine how social

interactions between transnational advocacy networks and states' agents contribute to the change of security norms in ASEAN, especially the ASEAN Way.

The ASEAN way on security in ASEAN pre-economic crisis

Understanding security in ASEAN is not complete without two important elements: the development-security nexus and the ASEAN Way. The 'development-security nexus'[45] in Southeast Asia could be seen as a historical legacy of the Second World War. It informed throughout the regional cooperative efforts in Southeast Asia.[46] The long decolonization process[47] and historical enmities among Southeast Asian states made them particularly concerned with regime security. When state building and nation building had become the main preoccupation of the state in the post-colonial era, security came to be defined strictly in terms of the state's security. Moreover, newly independent states were composed of various minorities, lumped together in the same territory since the colonial era. In the wake of the struggle for independence, irredentism followed. This posed serious threats to the state's security that leaders in the post-colonial era tried to consolidate. Economic development was therefore used as a means to placate secessionists and bring about domestic political stability. Thus, the positive connection between economic prosperity and political stability was established. The 'strong state' tradition is also substantiated by the state's role as a primary actor in stipulating economic development. Consequently, the state has also been perceived as the main security provider.

ASEAN's inaugural objective is to establish a framework under which the member countries can conduct peaceful relationships to prevent interruptions to economic development. In pursuing this aim, ASEAN member countries follow a set of interstate norms embedded in the ASEAN Declaration (1967), the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, and the Declaration of ASEAN Concord (1976). Most of these interstate norms are enshrined in the UN Charter, including non-interference, non-intervention, the respect for the rule of law, and pacific settlement of disputes.[48] However, some codes of conduct are unique to interstate relations among member countries. The ASEAN Way is a term favoured by ASEAN's leaders to describe the process of intra-mural interaction and to distinguish it from other, especially Western, multilateral settings.[49] There is no official meaning of the term; nonetheless, ASEAN leaders use it broadly to signify a regional solution to a regional problem. Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohammad has described the ASEAN Way as a 'winning formula' which 'more than anything else has held ASEAN together'.[50] His minister of foreign affairs went further when he stated that 'in fact, through the ASEAN way there are no problems or challenges that we in ASEAN cannot deal with.'[51] The ASEAN Way is related closely to how ASEAN has been viewing and solving problems, especially security ones, in the region. The doctrine of non-interference and non-intervention is firmly established in the ASEAN code of conduct to the point that it is viewed as one of the core elements of the ASEAN Way. The ASEAN Way also includes minimization of strict institutionalism, and consensus building achieved through a consultative process. That the mechanism for the pacific settlement of disputes[52] has never been invoked illustrated how ASEAN members preferred to avoid concrete institutional mechanism. The general aversion of legal mechanism is due to the fear of states' sovereignty erosion.

The development-security nexus and the ASEAN way played an important role in sustaining state-centric security concept. Strict non-interference implies the states' absolute rights to prevent what they deem to be domestic issues from being raised in the international level. Avoidance of legally binding mechanisms allows flexible space for states to conduct their policies within very broad guidelines. It was impossible for humans to be perceived as the referent subject of the security concept mainly because the security of human was subsumed by 'the dominant state-centered discourse and practice.'[53] The people were regarded only as an integral part of the development policy in order to prevent uprisings resulting from poverty (which could result in the deterioration of domestic stability and states' security).

Considering ASEAN's both guiding principles, security concept was centered on the state, and human security was not paid any particular attention. However, this did not mean that the "security of state" in ASEAN was limited to the military scope. Asian countries have been familiar with comprehensive security, which generally means that security goes beyond (but does not exclude) military means, and embraces political, economic, and socio-cultural means of providing security.[54] The trend towards holistic viewing of security is not a direct result from the termination of the Cold War, although it highlighted the concept's relevance. Japan was first to coin the phrase to highlight the much neglected military dimension in Japan's security policy, incorporating it into more holistic view of security perceptions. Quite apart from the prominence which the term acquired in Japanese security policy after the mid-1970s, comprehensive security has been most extensively developed in Southeast Asia.[55] In the mid-1980s, the ASEAN member states adopted the notion.[56]

The comprehensive view of security has been influencing member states' policy and behaviour.[57] Indonesia's Doctrine of *Ketahanan Nasional* (National Resilience), Malaysia's comprehensive approach to security, and Singapore's Total Defense all illustrate how comprehensive security influences security policies. For example, Indonesia's national resilience is a multifaceted concept comprising of ideological, political, economic, socio-cultural, and security-cum-defense dimensions.[58] Economic development was accorded top priority because it was viewed as a vital foundation of national resilience. However, rival political ideologies were perceived as destabilizing the national resilience, and had to be prevented.[59] In order to achieve national unity and stability, legislative and military measures were employed to suppress dissidents. Comprehensive security maintains the rationale of regime consolidation; thus, it fits perfectly with the security policies that emphasize internal security defined broadly.

Comprehensive security strengthens the state rather than facilitate individuals to be at the core of security policy despite the fact that it connects well with the developmental agenda in ASEAN governments. While ASEAN states may have had an expanded notion of security beyond military concerns, their idea of comprehensive security was no different from the dominant state-centric approach of conceptualizing security.[60] Although human security issues did resurface in many important ASEAN official documents, these issues were not incorporated in the national security agendas. Economic development was the way to achieve people's well-being which was viewed as a means towards an even higher and more important end, that is, the regime stability and survival.

Some Asian scholars proposed that the concept of comprehensive security should include the security of individual persons and their families.[61] Nonetheless, it is hard to argue that the same opinion had entered states' security discourse as well. ASEAN states were not 'highly cognitively motivated to analyze counterattitudinal information'[62] because no threatening environment that could make the state seriously consider the new information existed at that time. As long as the rationale of political stability through economic development was working,[63] there was really no need for the states to seek alternative norms in conducting their policies.

Important differences exist between the concept of comprehensive security, and the notion of human security. Human security is 'a distinctive notion, which goes well beyond all earlier attempts by Asian governments to redefine and broaden their own traditional understanding of security as protection of sovereignty and territory against military threats'.[64] Human security is not a subset within comprehensive security which focuses more on stability and order. Human security sees that protecting the dignity and safety of people is an end in itself, while comprehensive security sees that this only serves as a means for achieving national security.[65] Hence, comprehensive security still regards the state as the principal actor and the only referent of security. As Johnston argues, the actor will be more easily persuaded if it 'has few prior, ingrained attitudes that are inconsistent with the counterattitudinal message'.[66] Given that comprehensive security and human security disagrees on the subject of security, the latter is in inferior position to compete with the former which was already established firmly in the region.

Although the 1994 UNDP Human Development Report introduced human security concept officially to the states all over the world, including ASEAN members, ASEAN actually encountered international pressure in terms of human rights before human security became in vogue. Human rights constitute an important part of human security concept, and also counter the state-centric security discourse. At the Regional Meeting for Asia of the World Conference on Human Rights, Asian states announced in the 1993 Bangkok Declaration that

> while human rights are universal in nature, they must be considered in the context of a dynamic and evolving process of international norm-setting, bearing in mind the significance of national and regional particularities and various historical, cultural and religious backgrounds;[67]

This was a diversion from unconditionally accepting human rights as universal. However, it showed that ASEAN states were aware of the 'counterattitudinal norms' as opposed to the formerly embraced state-centric norms, and were made to come up with the way to deal with them. The 1993 ASEAN Ministerial Meeting endorsed the idea that there should be a regional human rights mechanism, in line with paragraph 36 of the Vienna Declaration adopted at the World Conference on Human Rights regarding the role played by national institutions as part of the human rights architecture.[68] However, the proposal was far from being materialized, given that the establishment of a concrete mechanism was against the ASEAN Way.

As opposed to the stance taken by the governments, some 240 representatives of more than 110 NGOs from 26 countries across the Asia-Pacific region came together to propose their stance in the 1993 'Bangkok NGO Declaration'. They agreed that 'The human rights are of universal concern and are universal in value, the advocacy of human rights cannot be considered to be an encroachment upon national

sovereignty.'[69] This illustrated that there was a gap between Track I and Track III understanding of people-centric security norms. The Bangkok NGO Declaration also proposed several recommendations for the regional Commission on Human Rights.

It can be argued that human-centric norms in ASEAN began to emerge from 1993 where the World Conference on Human Rights forced ASEAN members to come out with the stance regarding human rights issue. The 1994 UNDP Report helped formalize the concept of human security. The NGOs worked as the main norm entrepreneurs in the process of norms emergence according to Finnemore and Sikkink's norms 'life cycle'. However, the norms did not cascade due to lack of threatening environment which could motivate the state to consider counterattitudinal information.

It is difficult to pinpoint when the NGOs in ASEAN embraced human security concept since the concept itself resulted from socialization process at many levels. However, human security provided NGOs with an opportunity to reframe the same issues under a new framework. The issues of rights and needs were under the framework that the states would most likely pay attention to: security. One of the attempts in promoting human-centric norms was advocating people-centric model in opposition to the growth-oriented model that strengthened the regime's security. The NGOs focused on people as the core in solving problems arising from the state's model: poverty, environmental decline, and social disintegration.[70] The People's Forum, initiated in the Christian Conference of Asia as early as 1973,[71] has been organizing conferences in parallel with the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Summits in order to convey the message that the growth-oriented development model is not the only path towards well-being.

Another example of NGOs' role in promoting people-centric discourse was initiated within the ASEAN context. The Asian Exchange for New Alternatives (ARENA) was formed in Bali, Indonesia in the early 1980s. ARENA intends to form a contact point for intellectuals to search for a more humane social order. It has also been involved in the Asian Task Force on NGOs (ATF), which organizes training workshops and dialogues.[72] Many co-organized workshops illustrated that the activists have been using these venues for forming and strengthening networks. Moreover, ASEAN Track III has no prior ingrained attitudes that are hostile to the new norms. This facilitated the acceptance of human security in Track III circles.

However, things are different in Track I and Track II diplomacy. They have been supporting each other in legitimizing the notion of comprehensive security. The ARF is evidence of the ASEAN Way in practice[73]: its process is characterized by consensus-building and minimal institutionalism. Since its inception, the ARF has been generally statist, geared to addressing the traditional security dilemma between states.[74] Comprehensive security is adopted as the theme of the forum, as is in the case of CSCAP. CSCAP established five working groups as the primary mechanism for its activities: 1) maritime cooperation 2) the enhancement of security cooperation in North Pacific/Northeast Asia 3) confidence and security-building measures 4) cooperative and comprehensive security and 5) transnational crime. None of the working groups particularly dealt with human security issues. This also occurred in ASEAN-ISIS. Given that ASEAN-ISIS is endorsed by governments,[75] it is not surprising that the line it takes often coincides with that of the states. Many ASEAN-ISIS conferences as well as meetings between ASEAN member countries officials and representatives of the ASEAN-ISIS such as the meeting in January 1995 in

Bangkok and in Jakarta two months later cover the concept of comprehensive security as the main norms governing regional political and security cooperation.[76]

The dominant state-centric security discourse in Track I and Track II was due to the fact that Track II diplomacy is dependent upon the consent, endorsement and commitment, often including financial commitment, of governments. According to Caballero-Anthony, 'Track II security discourse reflected similar themes, hence reinforced the state-centric, albeit comprehensive understanding of security.'[77] This leads her to contend that 'one could therefore conclude that whatever attempts were made to challenge the dominant security discourse and offer alternative perspectives were not found in the Track I or Track II circles'.[78] It cannot be said that the socialization process occurring through the interactions between Track I and Track II would cause any change in the state-centric security discourse given that both actors have virtually the same agendas from the beginning.

The emerging prominence of Track III activities highlights the limitations of Track II in providing critical fora for important issues in the region.[79] With the stark contrast between the state-centric discourse adopted by Track I and Track II on the one hand and the people-centric one embraced by Track III on the other, it is not surprising that one will find few, if any, interactions between NGOs and the governments. As long as the state was capable of delivering security induced by economic development to its people, alternative models found little chance to be of serious consideration. This would change due to the disillusionment from the economic crisis.

Human security in ASEAN post-economic crisis

There was little debate about the utility and legitimacy of ASEAN's institutional norms during its first thirty years.[80] Most members witnessed high economic growth rates from its export-driven trade policy. High economic performance in the region, also known as the 'East Asian Miracle'[81] was associated with values prevalent in the Asian region in general[82], and the ASEAN Way in particular. With the state as the main vehicle in delivering high growth rates and security, ASEAN's prevalent state-centric security norms sustained the positive relationship between security and economic development. However, it would be greatly challenged in the face of the 1997 Asian economic crisis, occurring coincidentally with ASEAN's 30th anniversary. (The article will not explore the complicated causes[83] of the 1997 economic crisis because this is beyond its scope.)

The economic growth in the past three decades before the crisis helped most ASEAN members to be able to fight back poverty and improve the overall human development index in the region.[84] That continuous rise in living standards came to a sudden halt in the face of the 1997 economic crisis.[85] The crisis forced the governments to reduce wage rates and employments, resulting in decreasing purchasing power and high unemployment rates. The social repercussions could have been cushioned off should the government had any meaningful social safety nets programs. However, they were not adequately provided, illustrating the failure on the part of the government to provide security for people's livelihoods. Real wages decline also provided a setback for rising living standards and poverty alleviation which used to sustain the rationale of political stability through economic

development in the pre-crisis era, as well as the state's legitimacy as the main guarantor of people's security. The positive relationship between security and state-induced development was challenged.

The Asian economic crisis made ASEAN members review their state-centric security practice in two ways. Firstly, the crisis was a novel phenomenon for the region that has been enjoying continuous economic growth for decades. Even though critics about the way the growth developed existed[86] before the actual crisis took place, it was far from imagination that the crisis would be this drastic. The new and threatening environment was one of the four ideal combinations that could induce the states to be more receptive to 'counterattitudinal information' by increasing its motivation to consider new information in unfamiliar situation. The crisis was also a 'threatening environment': it posed severe economic, social, and political threats to ASEAN member countries.

Secondly, enormous human sufferings from the crisis put the rationale of achieving state security through economic growth in serious doubt. In post-crisis era, the state's role of being the sole provider of security to its citizens was damaged since it was no longer capable of delivering continuous economic growth and sustaining living standards. Inadequate social safety net programs on the part of the governments made recovering from the impact of the crisis painful for citizens, who did not expect a sudden disruption in their daily lives to occur when they had to lose their jobs. The crisis also put the state at a difficult position in defending its legitimacy achieved through guaranteeing improved well-being of the citizens.[87] Therefore, the security norms that regard the state as a referent subject were also put in doubt. Moreover, the interconnectedness of the regional economies which contributed to rapid contagion of the crisis clearly demonstrated that transnational problems resulting in massive human sufferings could not be dealt with alone. Rather, they must be tackled through cooperation. This in turn put ASEAN security norms, particularly the ASEAN Way that stresses the importance of state's sovereignty above all else, at stake.[88] Consequently, the 1997 economic crisis provided opportunities for ASEAN to pay more attention to the competing human centric norm laid dormant before the crisis. Despite the serious hardship the economic crisis evoked, ASEAN's role was minimal in solving the crisis. The ASEAN Way prevented any concrete institutional mechanism that could bring about the organization's collective approach in dealing with the crisis. Thus, the solutions could materialize only in an 'ad hoc' form and through a careful consensus-building process. However, ASEAN leaders recognized that the crisis had serious implications across the region and that cooperative efforts were needed in order to solve the problems.[89] The proposal of 'constructive intervention' by Thai Minister of Foreign Affairs Surin Pitsuwan in 1998 most clearly illustrated that the ASEAN Way was wavering in the face of the economic crisis, given that the strict non-interference used to be the unchallenged bedrock of ASEAN institutional norm since its inception. It could be viewed as the first step towards the derogation of the state-centric security concept firmly established in the ASEAN Way. However, the incident also demonstrated that the ASEAN Way was still not radically disapproved and continued to be instrumental in ASEAN. Surin had to soften his proposal into 'flexible engagement' due to opposition from other ASEAN members after a meeting with senior officials on June 26, 1998.[90] Although it was backed by ASEAN's Secretary-General, ASEAN leaders who feared their domestic issues would be discussed publicly at ASEAN level angrily rejected Surin's

initiative.[91] The proposal of 'flexible engagement' was toned down to an 'enhanced interaction' whose meaning remained vague, and was eventually adopted by ASEAN foreign ministers as a reluctant concession to what Surin formerly proposed. That the original proposal had been watered down until it was unanimously agreed upon by all ASEAN foreign ministers only showed that the ASEAN Way was still working in terms of the consensus building process. Nonetheless, it demonstrated that the ASEAN Way which was wholeheartedly embraced by all ASEAN leaders until it achieved the point of consensus in the pre-crisis era was being questioned by some ASEAN members. It should also be noted that Thailand was very cautious in avoiding challenging the traditional norms in ASEAN directly. While arguing that ASEAN should be able to 'discuss all issues once considered as "taboos"', Surin also stressed Thailand's 'continued commitment to non-interference as the cardinal principle for the conduct of (ASEAN) relations.'[92]

The serious consequences of the economic crisis prompted ASEAN leaders to issue a joint statement known as 'ASEAN Vision 2020' in December 1997 which endorsed human security-related issues such as drugs, nuclear weapons, and food security. Although it can be argued that the Vision's immediate aim was to forge closer economic ties in order to help solving the economic crisis,[93] its stated objective of being a 'community of caring societies' intended to achieve more than the aspect of 'the freedom from want' of human security. It also urged ASEAN member states to move toward 'being governed with the consent and greater participation of the people' and to 'focus on the welfare and dignity of the human person and the good of the community'.[94] All of this is consistent with the concept of human security by seeing humans at the core of member states' policies. It is also the first time that ASEAN publicly endorsed a phrase like 'dignity of the human person' in its joint declaration.

The ASEAN Vision 2020 was followed by the Hanoi Plan of Action and the Statement on Bold Measures adopted at the 6th ASEAN summit in the following year in order to execute the aims laid down in the Vision, demonstrating ASEAN's commitment to realize the Vision.[95] This showed that ASEAN government generally accepted at the time the Vision was released that transnational problems did not only threaten the state's security, and one way to tackle the problems was through 'human resource development'.[96] It signified a move away from the concept of comprehensive security because the Vision's main purpose is not to strengthen states' sovereignty or stability, but to achieve a community of states whereby the human dignity and equitable access to resources are protected.

The eroding of the ASEAN Way at ASEAN level happened in parallel with a series of conferences critical of the dominant state-centric security concept organized by various track III institutions. The Peace Research Institute of Tokyo's International Christian University, Asia Cultural Forum on Development, Focus on the Global South of Chulalongkorn University's Social Research Institute, Forum-Asia, and Berkeley's Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainable Development co-sponsored a conference on 'Alternative Security Systems in the Aia-Pacific Region' at Bangkok, Thailand in 1997.[97] The economic crisis has, in a way, provided a strategic opportunity for Track III to highlight its human-centric agenda during the time when the government's attention was captivated in this novel and threatening environment.

The ARF main concerns were predominantly traditional during the crisis: confidence-building measures, peace keeping, counter-terrorism, and transnational

crime.[98] There was relatively no change in the security norms in the ARF comparing to the period before the crisis took place. When we look at track II activities during and after the economic crisis, it was still the economic aspect of the comprehensive security that was securitized, not human. Papers from the fifth and sixth meetings of the CSCAP Working Group on Comprehensive and Cooperative Security in 1998 and 1999[99] focused almost solely on the Asian economic crisis and its implications for the regional security structure. The issues that came up in the conferences also included traditional security concerns such as Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests and confidence-building measures for regional land borders.[100] It can be said that the concept of comprehensive security and the state-centric ASEAN Way was still firmly embedded in track II circle. The state-centric value embedded in both the ASEAN Way and the comprehensive security concept made it difficult for ASEAN members to change the way they view the referent subject of security from states to humans. In other words, the human centric norms were not yet internalized in both Track I and Track II. However, it could be said that the crisis did highlight the efforts by Track III in proposing alternative security discourse and made states give the competing norms some consideration. This would be more evident when we look at an ASEAN member which was actively advocating human security concept at the ASEAN level.

Thailand was the first to use the term 'human security' at ASEAN level. At the Manila Post Ministerial Conference in July 1998, Surin proposed that an ASEAN-PMC Caucus on human security be set up. He argued that 'the human costs of this economic crisis' would 'impact upon all the achievements that we have made together so far', and would 'inevitably threaten the region as a whole'.[101] Therefore,

> Those members who are interested and ready should join hands in mapping out steps and strategies for long-term approach to the cure for and prevention of 'human security' in our region.[102]

Although the proposal for the ASEAN Caucus on human security was toned down to the ASEAN-PMC caucus on social safety nets due to lack of support at the meeting, the ASEAN leaders were still reluctant to endorse the new caucus.[103] For Surin, the rationale behind the caucus on social safety nets was still very much intact with human security concept.

While other states still cherished the ASEAN Way as an institutional norm, as the proposals tended to be blocked at the ASEAN level, it is worth taking a closer look as to why Thailand embraced the alternative discourse (or 'counterattitudinal information') more readily than others. Surin has been campaigning for human rights promotion in the Southern part of Thailand as one of the Democratic Party election campaign. He was quite well known in track III circles, having been invited to be a keynote speaker and participant in many track III activities that were not limited only in ASEAN. Through the social interactions with the transnational advocacy network with human security agenda, the state official had come to embrace the concept. The 'socialized' official then proposed the alternative human-centric agenda to ASEAN. The socialization process was facilitated by the fact that Thailand was among those who received the hardest blow from the economic crisis. As Johnston argues, when facing a novel or threatening environment, the actor will be more highly cognitively motivated to analyze counterattitudinal information.[104] The crisis put Thailand in new and threatening environment, thus inducing it to seriously consider counterattitudinal information. However, this could not fully explain why Thailand actively proposed alternative security discourse at ASEAN level because other

member countries also faced the harshness of the economic crisis (albeit in a lesser degree). The factor that marked Thailand's difference from other member countries is that the persuader represented a 'small, intimate, high effect in-group'[105] values to which it has wanted to belong: the human security-concerned 'middle powers'.

Thailand is the only country in ASEAN that joined the human security network (HSN). HSN is a group of like-minded countries that maintains dialogue on questions pertaining to human security at the level of Foreign Ministers.[106] It was even a founding member when the network was formed in 1999.[107] Moreover, Surin was later appointed a commissioner in the Commission on Human Security. With this ingrained attitude to be a member of 'in-group' who were concerned about human security in the eyes of the international society, the transnational advocacy network could achieve their goals in advancing human-centric security norms more easily in Thailand than in other ASEAN member countries who did not desire to be member of groups which would require them to change their state-centric security norms. This is why almost all proposals by Thailand that challenged the state-centric security norms were blocked or watered down by other members at the ASEAN level.

Taking Finnemore and Sikkink's norm 'life cycle' into consideration, it could be said that Thailand was persuaded successfully during the norm emergence stage from factors explained above. Thailand then acted as a norm leader, and tried to convince other member states to follow the same path. ASEAN was facing the 'norm cascade' stage whereby states began to consider the new information, but it was not yet habitualized or replaced the existing state-centric norms.

Human Security in ASEAN Post 9/11

The series of terrorist attacks that took place on September 11, 2001 on American soil[108] did not only cause America's realignment of priorities in its security policies, but also had vast implications in other regions, especially in Asia where a number of countries had been close allies of the US. In its quest for support on the 'war on terror' which has come to define American foreign policy since, the US has designated certain states in Asia as the front line, or as part of a second front in this war.[109] Southeast Asia (Malaysia and Indonesia in particular) has been considered America's second front in its struggle against terrorism. However, amidst closer cooperation between the US and ASEAN members, there was a trend of prioritizing national security at the expense of human rights. Several policies adopted by ASEAN members as a part of fighting against terrorism resulted in the threats to human security. Given that the 1997 economic crisis served as a tipping point in 'waking up' ASEAN members from the reliance on their performance legitimacy and made them paid more attention to human security issues, it is even more interesting to explore the reasons why this crisis seemed to jolt ASEAN back to its state-centric security discourse.

Despite the general commitment to human rights protection over the years, the US practice post 9/11 proved that national security came before human security. To gain support for its war on terror, the US government compromised its stance on human rights by collaborating with countries with poor human rights records, and even altered its attitude towards some incidents that normally would have raised eyebrows. The shift in US policy had important implications for ASEAN. Formerly, a part of international pressure ASEAN experienced regarding human rights issues also

came from US foreign policy. However, in the wake of the war on terror, the US has modified its attitudes in this area. For example, Malaysia's Internal Security Act (ISA), once regularly criticized by the US for its arbitrary use against domestic political opponents, is now seen as essential in a counterterrorism context.[110] In July 2001, the US Secretary of State Colin Powell told Malaysia's Foreign Minister Syed Hamid that a meeting between President Bush and Prime Minister Mahathir could take place only if there was progress in the treatment of political dissidents, including the arrest of Anwar Ibrahim. However, when Mahathir and Bush met at the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Summit a year later, Bush made no public comment on Malaysia's human rights records.[111] If the US stance in this area weakened, it should follow that ASEAN would be less motivated to consider any counterattitudinal message to its state-centric security discourse.

The US saw ASEAN as an important strategic partner in its anti-terrorist campaign, especially the members with large Muslim populations such as Indonesia and Malaysia.[112] Consequently, it strengthened bilateral counterterrorism ties with individual ASEAN member countries. Singapore has also been a vital source of intelligence cooperation. It was the only country whose intelligence services were qualified to the high standard of successful intelligence cooperation.[113] The Philippines was crucial in offering a strategic military base in cracking down the Abu Sayyaf terrorist group and was granted 'Major Non-NATO Ally' status in 2003.[114] Therefore, the US may be reluctant in post 9/11 era to impose pressure or other requirements which could result in ASEAN's withdrawal of support in the war on terror.

As Johnston argues, the actor would be highly cognitively motivated to analyze counterattitudinal information when it faces a very novel or threatening environment.[115] Given that the 9/11 event no doubt qualified as threatening, it cannot, however, be said that terrorism was novel in Southeast Asia. Therefore, it is legitimate to question why ASEAN post 9/11 was not more receptive towards human security norms as it seemed to be right after the post-economic crisis. One of the reasons could be that although the rationale of political stability through economic development was challenged immediately after the economic crisis, it was reinstated not long before the 9/11 event took place. The economic crisis did help further the norm cascade stage by providing a new and threatening situation for the state to be able to seriously consider a competing norm. However, when the economic crisis subsided and the state was able to claim the duty of the security provider once again, the state moved away from the threatening situation back into the pre-existing comfortable notion of state-centric security concept. Most ASEAN states recovered from the economic crisis because of initiatives from the part of the governments. The most prominent example was Malaysia. It seemed from the recovery that, after all, the state was still the core instigator in supplementing security through economic development. This prevented the state's legitimacy from being eroded altogether by the impact of the economic crisis, and also prevented alternative human-centric norms from taking a strong hold before another crisis, the 9/11, took place.

ASEAN was accused of its slow collaboration on counterterrorism measures.[116] This was the same accusation when it was slow to deal with the economic crisis due to the consensus-building process and general trend to avoid concrete mechanism. The members' early responses to the terrorist attacks upon the US were diplomatic, i.e. declaration of condolences, or bilateral, i.e. sending troops to

show support in America's war on terror in Afghanistan and Iraq. The regional cooperation on counterterrorism began to flesh out when the ASEAN Declaration on Joint Action to Counter Terrorism was adopted at the 7th ASEAN Summit at Brunei Darussalam in November 2001. In its Joint Communiqué declared at the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Terrorism at Kuala Lumpur in May 2002, the ASEAN Ministers in charge of terrorism in their respective countries also entrusted the Senior Officials to execute the Work Programme on Terrorism to implement the ASEAN Plan of Action to Combat Transnational Crime approved in the same year. After the Bali bombing in 2002 whereby over 200 people were killed,[117] ASEAN seemed to be more active regarding the collaboration on counterterrorism due to the close proximity of the incident. There was another Declaration on Terrorism released at the 8th ASEAN Summit at Phnom Penh only one month after the Bali incident.[118]

Right after the 9/11 event, it seemed that the security trend in ASEAN was reoriented to be more state-centric. The Bush administration's stronger take on national security had reoriented the security thinking on the part of its strategic partners in Southeast Asia to go back to the long embedded state-centric security norms in the ASEAN Way. It also resulted from the fact that the human-centric norms were not yet fully internalized among ASEAN members before the 9/11 took place. Moreover, the threat posed by terrorism appeared to link better with the traditional security concerns inherent in the comprehensive security concept. Unlike the economic crisis, terrorism's impacts seemed to be more immediate: it caused instant death. Although the comprehensive security accepts that security is multidimensional, 'military strength remained a core priority'.[119] The threats from terrorism did not challenge the rationale of political stability through economic development like the economic crisis. Instead, it provided space for the state to sustain its legitimacy, which may have come at the expense of human security sacrifice. This led Caballero-Anthony to note that

> At least in Southeast Asia, the tipping points of the Asian financial crisis and 9/11 only strengthened the thinking that state (national) security matters, and that the language of securitization, the speech act, will continue to be the domain of state actors.[120]

I would like to argue however, that this is true only in the immediate period after the 9/11. The security environment right after the incident provided the space for the government to take the initiative in counterterrorism, and some human security sacrifice was glossed over in the wake of the war against terror. Nonetheless, after the war on terror has 'cooled down' in Southeast Asia, it now seems that ASEAN has made some advancements regarding human security, with the exception in its official multilateral security dialogue, the ARF.

The main Track I actor, the ARF, has been quite active in setting counterterrorism measures. At an ARF ministerial meeting on counterterrorism in Bali in 2004, the Ministers agreed to establish an ad hoc working group on terrorism that would 'identify new areas for improvement of cooperation and assistance' regarding counterterrorism.[121] The governmental officials met regularly in the ARF forum to discuss prevention of terrorism since 9/11. So far, human security has not yet entered the ARF dialogue. There was no workshop or meeting with human security related theme. It would be difficult for it to embrace counterattitudinal information which directly challenged the pre-existing norm. The threat from terrorism was hardly new in the ARF, given that it already formed a working group on this as far back as in 1994. Although human security has not yet penetrated ASEAN multilateral security dialogue occurring in the ARF forum, there appeared to be interesting developments

in other multilateral venues such as in the ASEAN Summit, where human security related norms were mentioned in the official statement adopted at the Summit.

When the Hanoi Plan of Action expired, ASEAN leaders adopted the Vientiane Plan of Action which spans from 2004-2010 at the 10th ASEAN Summit in 2004.[122] The summit acts as one of the official meetings among ASEAN leaders, and is one of the Track I venues. The Vientiane Plan aspires, in its aim to achieve ASEAN socio-cultural community, to 'lift the quality of life of its peoples, sustainably use natural resources and strengthen its cultural identity towards *a people-centred ASEAN*'.[123] It was the first time that the term that was closely related to human security concept was used officially in ASEAN. Human security was also embraced by the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation. The Leaders' Declaration in 2002 has pledged APEC 'not only to advancing the prosperity of our economies, but also to the complementary mission of ensuring *the security of our people*'.[124] This had an important implication. The APEC Leaders saw 'ensuring the security of the people' as separate from the task of advancing 'the prosperity of (ASEAN) economies'. Formerly, human development, or human security was viewed as an integral part in ensuring the economic growth. It did not secure its own distinct place on a separate agenda. The use of the term signified that ASEAN leaders were now willing to talk about the competing norms. It seemed that the norms were still in the second stage of the norm 'life cycle' according to Finnemore and Sikkink: they continue to cascade. There exists a chance that the human-centric norms would stop at this stage. However, it is also plausible to argue that official endorsement represented a change in attitude on the part of ASEAN leaders, since it could 'trap' the states in the language and terms they use, and finally change the rhetoric to the standard of appropriateness.

There seemed to be a change in Track II security norms as well. The most illustrative example occurred in the CSCAP. In 2004, it restructured all the working groups. The Working Group on the Comprehensive and Cooperative Security was discontinued, signifying the weakening of state-centric security norms in Track II. In its place, there was a Working Group on Human Trafficking[125], which was a non-traditional security concern. Comparing with the Working Group in 1994 that only covered traditional security issues, this could demonstrate a change in the attitude of Track II diplomacy. Its agenda no longer mirrored Track I agenda perfectly, given that human security has not yet appeared in any of the ARF Working Groups. The CSCAP also organized conferences with human security themes in November 2003.[126]

What accounted for the change in attitude of both the official circle and Track II diplomacy? We must not ignore the role of Track III diplomacy in actively socializing Track I and Track II towards human security-related norms. Given that Track III did not have the political space to act within the ARF due to the difference of the guiding principle, i.e. the state-centric ASEAN Way and human-centric security norms, it tried to hold a joint conference, inviting governmental officials and Track II academics to interact with Track III activists. This illustrated that Track III did not only see an importance in forging a closer collaboration within non-governmental circles, it also tried to interact with officials from Track I to strengthen human security policy networks.

Given that governmental officials participated in both Track I and Track II diplomacy, why did the socialization process result differently? It could be that the

governmental officials participate in Track II diplomacy 'in their private capacity'. This allows for more flexibility and less surveillance from the part of the government in their officials' stance. Moreover, the governmental officials participating in Track II diplomacy also had more chance to interact with the norm entrepreneurs: academics, researchers, and activists who subscribe to human security norms. The Track II governmental officials who are successfully socialized may then continue to propose human centric norms in Track I circles.

The Track III attempts were highlighted when ASEAN leaders declared at the 11th ASEAN Summit in 2005 that they 'recognized that the civil society will play an increasing important role in ASEAN as we develop *a people-centred ASEAN Community*'.[127] They provided public support for 'the holding of the (ASEAN Civil Society) Conference annually on the sidelines of the ASEAN Summit and that its report be presented to the leaders.[128] Track III role was finally recognized in the official circle, although the human-centric norm they proposed was still not adopted by the ARF, which focused more on the traditional security concept.

Apart from the adoption of the Vientiane Plan of Action, the implementation of human security in ASEAN was relatively slow. The ASEAN Way still, in effect, prevented states from criticizing one another's 'internal' or 'domestic' affairs. However, Thailand constitutes one example of an ASEAN state where the human security language was secured in the political discourse. It also continued its role as a 'norm leader' in the post-9/11 era. Thai officials actively supported 'the Human Security Surveillance System' during the 2nd International Meeting of Experts on Social Safety Nets in APEC in 2004.[129] They proposed various indicators for the Human Security Surveillance System. Thailand is the first country in ASEAN to establish its own Ministry of Social Development and Human Security in 2002. The role of the non-governmental sector or Track III in Thailand was instrumental in pushing forward for the Ministry in the first place. The Ministry was established as a result of a bureaucratic reform from the 2002 Ministry Reformation Act.[130] The Act was enacted according to the 1997 Constitution that aims to allow more people's participation and transparency. The civil society was active first in lobbying the government for the 1997 Constitution when Thailand was hit the hardest by the economic crisis.[131] The Constitution opened up more political space for civil society to interact with and persuade the government. However, another factor that helped the process of socialization was that Thailand has wanted to be a member of an in-group, which shared human security norms, as among the countries that are member of the human security network. Its domestic development regarding human security, the most evident being the set up of the Ministry of Social Development and Human Security, made Thailand the Chair of the Human Security Network during May 2005-May 2006, and the host country of the Human Security Network Ministers Conference in May 2006.[132] On the other hand, the international pressure from the network helped ensure that Thailand's policy will be guided given that it is now entrusted with the responsibility to be the Chair of the intergovernmental Human Security Conference.

Human security norms have come a long way before it finally entered ASEAN discourse, and was mentioned in ASEAN official documents. Although ASEAN which emerged out of 9/11 event seemed to sway back to the long embedded state-centric norm in the region, recent developments proved otherwise. However, human security has not yet entered ASEAN Track I security dialogue which took place in the

ARF. The interesting change in attitude of ASEAN Track II diplomacy regarding human-centric norms demonstrated that the role of transnational advocacy networks, constituting ASEAN Track III diplomacy, was instrumental in causing the change. Track II now reflected human security issues whereas Track I's main concern is still oriented towards traditional security. It is still early to tell whether ASEAN has already internalized human security norms or not, viewing against ongoing human rights abuse in some member countries. However, it is a welcome thought that ASEAN began to use the language of human security in its official document, a first step towards habitualizing the norm. An ASEAN member, Thailand, has shown some domestic human security implementations, again as a result of Track III activities. It could be believed that Track II would continue to interact and socialize Track I, while an already socialized ASEAN member will continue to advocate human security-related norms at the ASEAN level. ASEAN is now more willingly to involve itself with the human security norms and debate the human security language, which was a stark contrast to the pre-economic crisis era.

Conclusion

In the light of the two crises that produced vast impacts on ASEAN, the 1997 economic crisis and the 9/11 event, ASEAN security norms seemed to move slightly from the state-centric norms guided by the ASEAN way, towards the human-centric stance proposed by the non-governmental circles. Both crises provided new and threatening environments, acting as a window of opportunity for ASEAN to seriously consider counterattitudinal information present from the pre-crisis era. The crises did not provide a ready-made norm shift in ASEAN, but they highlighted the problems of the state-centric security norms and opened up spaces for the competing norms to be debated. This does not mean, however, that the change in norms is an irreversible process. It can be seen when the heat of the economic crisis subsided, and when the security environment was instilled by fear immediately after the 9/11 event, that ASEAN states appeared to swing back to their long embedded state-centric practice. Nonetheless, ASEAN now is much more willing to use the language of human security than in the pre-crises era, and the role of the crises in provoking ASEAN to question its state-centric security practice is undeniable.

Although it cannot be asserted that human-centric norms are now internalized in ASEAN, recent developments such as the public endorsement of the norms still represented an interesting attitudinal change among ASEAN leaders. It could be said that the human-centric norms in ASEAN are still in the second stage of the norm 'life cycle', the norm cascade. It would be interesting to see whether the human-centric life cycle ends here, or continues towards the last stage, the internalization of norms, considering that there was a recent change in political situation in the country that used to act as a 'norm leader' in ASEAN: Thailand.

The change in ASEAN security norms must be viewed against the backdrop of the pre-existing norms, i.e. the comprehensive security notion and the ASEAN Way. The comprehensive security concept which was long embraced by ASEAN members concur with the human security concept in terms of the broadness of the security concept. However, it is also essentially state-centric, emphasizing on the importance of the state. This characteristic could play against human security acceptance in ASEAN.

It is also worth noting that ASEAN sees the comprehensive security concept as one way in realizing the ASEAN Vision 2020[133], which embraces a number of

human security issues. This might be a sign that the concept's state-centric characteristic is weakening, while its characteristic that accepts the broadness of the security concept remains unaffected. According to Acharya, the extent to which a new idea like human security could find acceptance in the region depends very much on how it resonates with existing ideas and practices concerning security.[134] If the ASEAN states see that the comprehensive security concept is not inconsistent with the human security concept, the chance is that it will be easier for them to willingly endorse the idea as their own, not as an alien concept proposed by external powers.

The instrumental role played by the non-governmental sectors, or Track III, produced an important part of the explanation of the change in ASEAN's attitudes towards human-centric norms. The crises, again, helped create an opportunity for these transnational activists to 'reframe' their agenda in the light of human security. Track I and Track II working in ASEAN multilateral diplomacy framework were both state-centric in the pre-crisis era. It was unimaginable for them to come up with the alternative security agendas given that most of the ASEAN members authorizing and participating in Track I and Track II were still very much embedded in the state-centric norms. By organizing numerous conferences that attempted to involve states' officials, Track III managed to influence Track II to adopt unconventional security issues in its workshop. Because state's officials participating in Track II do not have to bear the responsibility of representing their respective countries, it is easier for them to embrace new norms, which will in turn penetrate Track I when the Track II officials interact with Track I workers.

The human security norm has now entered the ASEAN official venue, such as the ASEAN Summit. There was also a trend for ASEAN leaders to recognize the contribution of Track III in the public statement, and encourage their work. However, the ARF, the main actor in Track I security dialogue, has not yet seriously discussed human security related norms. It still focused on more traditional security issues. It is interesting to see whether this will change in the future.

The state-centric ASEAN Way, a guiding principle embraced widely in ASEAN international relations, has been weakening as a result of both crises. The crises highlighted the fact that the transnational problems that posed serious threats to humans must be tackled on a regional basis through cooperation. The ASEAN Way's non-interference norm is challenged the most. This has an important implication for human security in ASEAN, since it will not be possible to solve human security problems when the states can still claim that the problems belong solely to the domestic realm.

The emerging ASEAN Way on human security is still strong on the consensus building process in reaching an agreement, which could be argued that it makes ASEAN stagnant and slows the process of reaching an agreement. However, consensus building actually facilitates states in coming to terms with the concept such as new as human security. According to Johnston,

> Put differently, consensus rules make obstinacy costly in ways that up-and-down voting rules do not: obstinacy threatens to undermine the effectiveness of the entire institution because its effectiveness is premised on consensus. It portrays the obstinate actor as one whose behaviour is fundamentally at odds with the purposes of the institution.[135]

It may be that the ASEAN Way on human security that slowly emerged out of many levels of interactions and socializations will take a long time in order to reveal what will be its characteristics. Nonetheless, it will inevitably be built on the former ASEAN Way, and will have to continue to materialize in the contested normative space ASEAN exists. However, recent developments illustrated that ASEAN is

edging towards human-centric norms. Whether the human security concept will be fully internalized in ASEAN or ASEAN will escape its rhetoric entrapment remains to be seen. However, as it stands, this seems to be quite a promising turn.

Notes

[1] ASEAN members are Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam.

[2] Fen Osler Hampson and others, *Madness in the Multitude: Human Security and World Order* (Oxford:Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 14.

[3] Peter A. Chalk, '"Grey area phenomena" and human security', in *Asia's Emerging Regional Order: Reconciling Traditional and Human Security*, ed. by William T. Tow, Ramesh Thakur and In-Taek Hyun (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2000), pp. 124-143 (p. 125).

[4] See Donald E. Weatherbee, 'Southeast Asia at Mid-Decade: Independence through Interdependence', in *Southeast Asian Affairs*, ed. by Daljit Singh (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1995), 3-27.

[5] For early discussion of middle powers, see Holbraad, Carsten, *Middle Powers in International Politics* (London: Macmillan, 1984); Annette Baker Fox, *The Politics of Attraction: Four Middle Powers and the United States* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977)

[6] See *Niche Diplomacy: Middle Powers after the Cold War*, ed. by Andrew Cooper (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997)

[7] See *Reframing the Agenda: The Impact of NGO and Middle Power Cooperation in International Security Policy*, ed. by Kenneth A. Rutherford, Stefan Brem, and Richard A. Matthew (London: Praeger, 2003); Peter Lawler, 'The Good State: In Praise of "Classical" Internationalism', *Review of International Studies* 31 (2005), 427-449.

[8] Cheaper air travel, the spread of phone, fax, internet, and e-mail usage have increased the network of interaction among the non-state actors with alternative agendas. See Emma Mawdsley and others,

Knowledge, Power and Development Agendas: NGOs North and South, NGO Management and Policy Series, no. 14 (Oxford: INTRAC, 2002), p. 4.

9 For example, state-directed genocide and violent suppression of minorities and dissidents.

10 W. B. Gallie, 'Essentially Contested Concept', *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 56 (1955-1956), 167-198.

11 classical and neoclassical realist security studies, security studies guided by rational choice theory which assumes that actors' behaviours are benefit-maximizing, and formal rational choice theory, i.e. game theory. See Gideon Rose, 'Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy', *World Politics* 51 (1998), 144-172. For discussion on rational choice theory 's contribution on security studies, see Stephen M. Walt, 'Rigor or Rigor Mortis?: Rational Choice and Security Studies', *International Security* 23 (1999), 5-48.

12 Steve Smith, 'The Contested Concept of Security', in *Critical Security Studies and World Politics*, ed. by Ken Booth, Critical Security Studies Series (London and Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005), pp. 27-61 (p. 32).

13 See for example, Richard Ullman, 'Redefining Security', *International Security* 8 (1983), 129-153; Jessica Tuchman Matthews, 'Redefining Security', *Foreign Affairs* 68 (1989), 162-177.

14 See Keith Krause and Michael Williams, 'Broadening the Agenda of Security Studies: Politics and Methods', *Mershon International Studies Review* 40 (1996), 229-254.

15 Smith, 'The Contested Concept of Security', p. 40.

16 Kraus and Williams, 'From Strategy to Security: Foundations of Critical Security Studies, Concepts and Cases', in *Critical Security Studies: Concepts and Cases*, ed. by Keith Krause and Michael Williams (London: University of London Press, 1997), pp. 33-59.

17 Ken Booth, 'Security and Emancipation', *Review of International Studies* 17 (1991), 313-326; Richard Wyn Jones, '"Message in a Bottle"? Theory and Praxis in Critical Security Studies', *Contemporary Security Policy* 16 (1995), 299-319; Richard Wyn Jones, ' "Travel Without Maps": Thinking About Security After the Cold War', in *Security Issues in the Post-Cold War World*, ed. by Jane Davis (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1996), pp. 196-218; Richard Wyn Jones, *Security, Strategy, and Critical Theory* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999)

18 Booth, 'Security and Emancipation', p. 319.

19 Wyn Jones, *Security, Strategy, and Critical Theory*, p. 119.

20 The earliest intellectual root of the concept can be traced to the Canadian psychologist W. E. Blatz's 'individual security' which sees that security is 'all inclusive and pervasive'. See W. E. Blatz, *Human Security: Some Reflections* (London: University of London Press, 1966)

21 Muthiah Alagappa, 'Rethinking Security', in *Asian Security Practice: Material and Ideational Influences*, ed. by Muthiah Alagappa (California: Stanford University Press, 1998), pp. 28-53 (p. 31).

22 See Sabina Alkire, 'A Conceptual Framework for Human Security' <http://www.crise.ox.ac.uk/pubs/workingpaper2.pdf> [accessed 24 April 2006]; United Nations Development Program (UNDP) Human Development Report 1994, 'New Dimensions of Human Security' <http://hdr.undp.org/reports/global/1994/en/> [accessed 12 April 2006]; Commission on Human Security, 'Human Security Now 2003' <http://www.humansecurity-chs.org/finalreport/index.html> [accessed 23 May 2006]; Alexandra Amouyel, 'What is Human Security?', *Human Security Journal* 1 (2006), 10-23; Roland Paris, 'Human Security: Paradigm Shift or Hot Air?', *International Security* 26 (2001), 87-102; Emma Rothchild, 'What is Security', *Daedalus* 124 (1995), 53-98.

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